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INNOVATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Natalie Ram
ABSTRACT—From secret stingray devices that can pinpoint a suspect’s
location, to advanced forensic DNA-analysis tools, to recidivism risk
statistic software—the use of privately developed criminal justice
technologies is growing. So too is a concomitant pattern of trade secret
assertion surrounding these technologies. This Article charts the role of
private law secrecy in shielding criminal justice activities, demonstrating
that such secrecy is pervasive, problematic, and ultimately unnecessary for
the production of well-designed criminal justice tools.
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First,
the Article establishes that trade secrecy now permeates American criminal
justice, shielding privately developed criminal justice technologies from
vigorous cross-examination and review. Second, the Article argues that
private law secrecy surrounding the inner workings—or even the
existence—of these criminal justice technologies imposes potentially
unconstitutional harms on individual defendants and significant practical
harms on both the criminal justice system and the development of welldesigned criminal justice technology. Third, the Article brings the
extensive literature on innovation policy to bear on the production of
privately developed criminal justice technologies, demonstrating that trade
secrecy is not essential to either the existence or operation of those
technologies. The Article proposes alternative innovation policies that the
government, as both a funder of research and the primary purchaser of
criminal justice technologies, is uniquely well-positioned to implement.
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law;
J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Princeton University. Many thanks to
Stephanie Bair, Jack Balkin, Teneille Brown, Jenny E. Carroll, Alta Charo,
Glenn Cohen, Robert Cook Deegan, Gregory Dolin, Michele Gilman, Hank
Greely, Yaniv Heled, William Hubbard, David Jaros, Max Mehlman, Lisa
Ouellette, W. Nicholson Price II, Sonja Ralston, Richard Re, John A.
Robertson, Rachel Sachs, Jake Sherkow, and Chris Slobogin for their
helpful comments on this project. This work also benefitted from feedback
at the BioLaw Conference at Stanford Law School, the Health Law
Professors’ Conference at Georgia State University, the Wiet Life Science
Law Scholars Conference at Loyola University Chicago School of Law,
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and the Junior Faculty Workshop at the University of Maryland. Finally,
thank you to the editors of the Northwestern University Law Review for
their excellent work. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Billy Ray Johnson was sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole for a series of sexual assaults and burglaries that he says he
did not commit.1 The primary evidence in the case consisted of traces of
DNA found on items from three crime scenes, including a phone, clothing,
and a zip tie investigators believed had been used to bind one of the
victims.2 In order to link Johnson to the crime-scene DNA, investigators
relied on TrueAllele, a privately developed and privately owned software
1

See Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harming-criminal-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/AL5T-3G6D]. There are at least two significant cases involving probabilistic
genotyping software in which the defendant’s last name is Johnson. Accordingly, this Article will refer
to the case involving Billy Ray Johnson as the “Billy Ray Johnson case” for clarity.
2
See
CYBERGENETICS,
PEOPLE
OF
CALIFORNIA
V
BILLY
RAY
JOHNSON,
https://www.cybgen.com/news/cases/California-v-Billy-Ray-Johnson.shtml
[https://perma.cc/NS4NL4CJ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017) (describing the Billy Ray Johnson case and TrueAllele’s role in it).
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program for analyzing DNA mixtures that typical DNA analysis cannot
resolve.3 Yet when an expert witness for Johnson sought to examine
TrueAllele’s source code, she was rebuffed.4 TrueAllele’s source code, its
creator Mark Perlin steadfastly maintained, is a trade secret.5 Perlin refused
to make that code available for review even when Johnson’s attorney
offered to sign a protective order.6 The judge in the case, meanwhile,
refused to order that the source code be disclosed—but did admit the DNA
analysis that TrueAllele generated into evidence.7 None of the
investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or even the judge in
Johnson’s case were permitted access to the source code of the crucial
software. Indeed, to date, no one outside of Cybergenetics—Perlin’s
company—has seen or examined that source code.8 Yet, largely based on
the DNA analysis that TrueAllele generated, Johnson was convicted.9
Billy Ray Johnson’s case is not the only recent example of the
criminal justice system relying on privately developed tools shielded by
assertions of trade secret protection.10 The use of trade secrets to inhibit
3

Wexler, supra note 1; CYBERGENETICS, supra note 2 (observing that “[d]ue to the complexity of
these low-level 3 and 4 person mixtures, human review of the data was largely inconclusive,” but that
TrueAllele “yielded match statistics from 33 mixture items. 8 of these items linked Johnson to the 3
crimes”).
4
Wexler, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See Respondent’s Brief at 73, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2017)
(quoting the trial court’s motion to review TrueAllele’s source code and explaining that “[t]he source
code is a trade secret. I don’t think adequate showing has been made to justify the breech [sic] of that
privilege”); id. at 74 (recounting that the trial court admitted TrueAllele’s analysis at trial over defense
objections).
8
See ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA 101 (2015); Robert
Gavin, Cybergenetics True Allele Casework DNA Study is Winner in Cold Case Murder Conviction,
TIMES UNION (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/Cybergenetics-TrueAllele-Casework-DNA-study-is-6171690.php [https://perma.cc/XU89-YQUL] (“Only [Perlin] and one
of his colleagues know the ‘source code’ behind [TrueAllele].”). Access to a machine on which a
particular software program is installed is not access to that software’s source code. The code that is
installed and runs on a particular machine is object code—a series of 1s and 0s that even few
programmers can read and translate. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of
the Growing Controversy Over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV.
97, 104 (2016). Source code, by contrast, is programming written in a language that other programmers
familiar with that programming language can read, write, and understand. Id. at 103–04. Once
complete, source code is “compiled”—translated—into object code. Id. at 104.
9
See Wexler, supra note 1; ABC News, East Bakersfield Residents React to the Conviction of Billy
Ray Johnson, YOUTUBE.COM (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoA_yUaPgvU
(including a Deputy District Attorney stating, “It was the DNA that enabled us to know who raped these
women”).
10
See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (observing the rise of trade secret assertion in
criminal cases).
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disclosure of technical information pervades the criminal justice process—
from investigation, to trial, to sentencing. For instance, CMI, Inc., the
manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer (a common breath test device for
intoxication), has repeatedly fought efforts to compel disclosure of its
devices’ source code in criminal cases, arguing that the source code is a
valuable trade secret. 11 Harris Corp., the private company that manufactures
and sells the bulk of stingray devices—which effectively turn a cell phone
into a real-time tracking device of startling precision—has gone even
further.12 It secured the cooperation of the federal government in preventing
disclosure of even the existence of these devices, not only to defense
counsel but even to courts themselves, based in part on the device’s
“valuable proprietary information”—their value as a trade secret.13 At
sentencing, meanwhile, many courts now rely on recidivism risk scores
generated by privately developed software whose formula for weighting
input factors is, once again, not disclosed on trade secret grounds.14 Even
the Solicitor General of the United States has acknowledged that “[s]ome
uses of an undisclosed risk-assessment algorithm” may raise significant
constitutional concerns.15

11
See, e.g., Charles Short, Note, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in
Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177, 182 (2009); Associated Press, Drunk Driving Cases
Turn on Source Code, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11752290/ns/
technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/drunk-driving-cases-turn-source-code
[https://perma.cc/ZN5N-NKCK] (in a drunken driving case, “[t]he company that makes the Intoxilyzer
refused to reveal the computer source code for its machine because it was a trade secret”); see also
Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1272 (2016) (observing that “[t]o date, only one
group of litigants has successfully gained access to a breath machine’s source code, and even then, only
upon court order after the state initially refused to disclose it”).
12
See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 104 (2017), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/JohFINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QJT-SPWG].
13
See Letter from Tania W. Hanna, Dir., Gov’t Relations, Harris Corp. & Evan S. Morris, Legal
Analyst, Gov’t Relations, Harris Corp. to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n (Oct.
12, 2010) [hereinafter Harris Letter], https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/10-814_MR13549_RES_ID2014-668.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9J7-JEC3] (revised request for confidentiality
of Harris Corporation); see also Joh, supra note 12, at 106.
14
See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶¶ 96–122, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749
(approving the use of COMPAS, a recidivism risk scoring tool, despite nondisclosure of the underlying
source code), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017); id. ¶ 51 (“Northpointe, Inc., the developer of
COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret.”); see also Adam Liptak,
Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secretalgorithms.html [https://perma.cc/6WZY-MSZB] (“Compas and other products with similar algorithms
play a role in many states’ criminal justice systems.”).
15
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017)
(No. 16-6387), 2017 WL 2333897, at *18 [hereinafter U.S. Loomis Brief]. To be sure, the Acting
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At each step in the criminal justice process, defendants, their
attorneys, and sometimes even the judges in whose courtrooms innocence,
guilt, or imprisonment is determined operate at an informational
disadvantage due to claims of corporate secrecy. These technologies pit
private law assertions of secrecy against criminal justice due process
norms.
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. It
demonstrates that, from investigation to sentencing, the role of private law
mechanisms in shielding criminal justice activities is growing. It explains
how these mechanisms are problematic for practical and potentially
constitutional reasons. And it argues that the secrecy surrounding criminal
justice technologies is not essential to their existence or operation. This
Article thus offers a way through the growing thicket of trade secrecy
assertion that now permeates criminal justice.
First, Part I establishes a common thread of private secrecy tools—
trade secrets foremost among them—at work in American criminal justice.
Technologies developed by private firms, subject to assertions of private
law protection, are now embedded in multiple stages of the criminal justice
process. As described above, police, prosecutors, and courts already make
use of such technologies. Although scholars previously have shed light on
some of these technologies, most have treated these technologies as though
they operate in separate silos and have not fully appreciated the role of
trade secret assertion throughout the criminal justice system.16 This Article
provides a deeper and broader assessment.
Second, Part II argues that the use of trade secrecy to shield criminal
justice technologies from disclosure threatens to stall the development of
effective (and appropriate) technology and puts new pressure on traditional
criminal defense protections. Well-designed and well-tested algorithms can
Solicitor General recommended that the Supreme Court deny certiorari in Loomis. Id. at *1. The Acting
Solicitor General explained that, in his view, “the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly declined to find a
due process violation” in Loomis’ case. Id. at *18. Nonetheless, the Acting Solicitor General’s
concession that use of risk-assessment algorithms may raise constitutional concerns is itself significant.
16
See, e.g., Joh, supra note 12 (discussing private secrecy tools in the Fourth Amendment context);
Roth, supra note 11 at 1274 (discussing the proliferation of algorithms throughout criminal
adjudication, but only briefly describing the issue and costs of trade secret assertion surrounding those
algorithms); Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants,
and the Constitution, 105 CAL. L. REV. 179, 209–13 (2017); Short, supra note 11 (discussing source
code discovery difficulties regarding Florida DUI cases only); cf. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014)
(discussing the rise of “Big Data” algorithms in consumer transactions, and focusing on credit scoring);
W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015) (describing the promise
and difficulties of highly complex predictive algorithms for personalized medicine). This is only now
beginning to change. See Wexler, supra note 10 (identifying trade secret assertion at multiple points in
the criminal justice process).
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advance the cause of criminal justice, making the impenetrable
interpretable or shifting aspects of decisionmaking from more to
(hopefully) less biased data sources.17 But a lack of transparency—and
accordingly an inability for defense counsel and others to verify and
validate these data sources—makes even the best designed algorithm
problematic. Access to source code and other similar information is often
essential for defendants to fully interrogate the algorithms that have led to
their arrest, conviction, or sentence. Private law protection surrounding the
inner workings or even the existence of new technology thus threatens to
undermine the ability of judges and defense counsel to ensure that criminal
justice respects constitutionally significant privacy interests, condemns
only the guilty, and punishes the guilty fairly.
Third, Parts III and IV offer a way forward, bringing the extensive
literature on innovation policy to bear on the production of privately
developed criminal justice algorithms. Existing literature, where it exists at
all, addresses these technologies within the confines of criminal law or the
law of evidence.18 A broader perspective, bridging the fields of intellectual
property and criminal justice, yields significant insights.
Contrary to the claims of developers, trade secret protection is not
essential for the production of useful algorithms. Innovation policy is more
than simply intellectual property rights like trade secrets and patents.19
Rather, mechanisms for encouraging innovation can fund companies doing
research—for example, through grants—or reward companies for the
successful products of that research—for example, through prizes or
regulatory exclusivities. Tax policy can reward both innovation-focused
research and its products.
Unlike trade secrecy, most of these mechanisms can be coupled with a
requirement to disclose source code or other relevant information beyond
the confines of a protective order or nondisclosure agreement. Part III
describes this multitude of policy mechanisms available for incentivizing
17
See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 79
(2016)
[hereinafter
PCAST
REPORT],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3A7A23P] (concluding that software programs like TrueAllele “clearly represent a major improvement over
purely subjective interpretation”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014)
(explaining that algorithmic tools in sentencing may “offer better predictions of future behavior than the
clinical judgments of treatment professionals such as psychiatrists and psychologists, or the intuitions of
criminal-justice professionals such as judges and probation officers”).
18
See, e.g., Joh, supra note 12 (criminal law lens); Roth, supra note 11 (same); Wexler, supra note
10 (evidence law lens).
19
See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate,
92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (summarizing the literature on patents versus prizes versus grants and
adding tax incentives to the range of innovation policy levers).
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innovation in the field of criminal justice algorithms, of which trade
secrecy is merely one. Identifying the uses, advantages, and potential costs
of various innovation levers makes plain that deference to assertions of
trade secret protection in the criminal justice arena is neither necessary nor
inevitable. When circumstances demand greater transparency about how
criminal justice technologies work, many tools of innovation policy are
readily available to deliver the innovation incentive previously provided by
secrecy.
Part IV accordingly proposes how innovation policies might be
adapted should trade secrecy give way in the face of constitutional and
other concerns. In this context, where there is good reason to require
disclosure surrounding court proceedings, developers are likely to respond
efficiently to mechanisms other than secrecy if secrecy is no longer
available. Moreover, achieving an alternate solution should be well within
reach. One key actor in innovation policy—the government, through its law
enforcement mission—is already inherently enmeshed in encouraging and
compensating innovation in this field as the sole (or at least primary)
purchaser of the fruits of that innovation. A key actor for enforcing
disclosure is also already enmeshed in the tension between trade secret
assertion and criminal justice norms—the courts. Courts should be
empowered by the existence of alternative innovation policy levers to order
trade secret disclosure without fear that useful algorithms will be lost.
Indeed, if courts begin to order trade secret disclosure frequently or
broadly, other government entities are well situated to institute
complementary innovation policies through procurement and other
policies, should additional compensation for innovation be necessary. Thus,
courts need not wait for legislatures to act.
I.

A PROLIFERATION OF SECRET TECHNOLOGY

Privately-developed algorithms have come to occupy a key role in
criminal justice processes,20 and along with them, assertions of trade secret
protection. Crucially, it is not merely the fact that algorithms are in use in
criminal investigations and proceedings that makes this pattern of
technological innovation worthy of note;21 nor is the fact that these
algorithms are developed by private companies, rather than by the state

20
See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1975 (2017) (“While scientific
instruments and cameras have been a mainstay in courtrooms for well over a century, the past century
has witnessed a noteworthy rise in the silent testimony of instruments.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
21
Though this use is certainly noteworthy. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 11.
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itself, that makes their use so problematic.22 Rather, it is the concomitant
pattern of trade secret assertion that cripples courts and defense counsel—
and sometimes prosecutors, as well—from ensuring accuracy in criminal
justice.
Broadly defined, a trade secret is information that is “subject to
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy and derives independent economic
value from its secrecy.”23 So long as the information at issue remains secret,
the legal protections of trade secret law will attach indefinitely.24 Of
greatest relevance here, so long as trade secret status remains intact, a trade
secret holder may assert that status in litigation to attempt to bar or limit
discovery of its protected information.
This Part surveys the conflict between private commercial interests
and criminal defense claims from criminal investigation, to trial, to
sentencing.
A. Secrecy in Policing
In March 2016, State v. Andrews became the first judicial decision to
hold that police cannot, without a warrant, make use of a stingray device.25
A stingray device is a cell site simulator, which allows police to track a cell
phone with near pinpoint accuracy in real time.26 It operates by mimicking
a cellphone tower, forcing “all nearby phones within its range to provide it
with identifying information.”27 And a stingray is a relatively small
22

Though this, too, is noteworthy. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 12.
W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (2016).
24
Id. at 1777.
25
See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); Spencer S. Hsu, A
Maryland Court is the First to Require a Warrant for Covert Cellphone Tracking, WASH. POST (Mar.
31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-maryland-court-is-the-first-torequire-a-warrant-for-covert-cellphone-tracking/2016/03/31/472d9b0a-f74d-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31
[https://perma.cc/95GJ-ENEJ].
26
Joh, supra note 12, at 104. Stingrays are also known as “IMSI catchers.” Stingray Tracking
Devices, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/stingraytracking-devices [https://perma.cc/UDU7-MMSY]. “IMSI,” in turn, stands for “international mobile
subscriber identity,” which is “a unique number, usually fifteen digits,” that identifies a particular
cellphone subscriber. Andrew Hemmer, Note, Duty of Candor in the Digital Age: The Need for
Heightened Judicial Supervision of Stingray Searches, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 295, 299 n.32 (2016).
The term “stingray” comes from the name of a particular model of cell site simulator. See Devin
Coldewey, Who Catches the IMSI Catchers? Researchers Demonstrate Stingray Detection Kit,
TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/02/who-catches-the-imsi-catchersresearchers-demonstrate-stingray-detection-kit [https://perma.cc/4XPH-YHHP]. The company that
manufactures the Stingray, Harris Corporation, also manufactures several other similar models,
including the KingFish, the TriggerFish, and the Hailstorm devices. Joh, supra note 12, at 1044 n.105.
Nonetheless, colloquially, the term “stingray” has stuck. See Coldewey, supra.
27
Joh, supra note 12, at 104; see also Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More than
a Pen Register, and Less than a Wiretap: What the Stingray Teaches Us About How Congress Should
23
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device—roughly the size of a suitcase.28 It can be “carried by hand,
installed in a vehicle, or even mounted on a drone.”29
A stingray device can be deployed in at least two ways. First, where
police know the hardware number of a suspect’s cell phone, investigators
can use a stingray to pinpoint that phone’s location in real time.30 This is
what occurred in Andrews. Baltimore police used a stingray device called
Hailstorm to track Kerron Andrews to a particular residence, where they
arrested him on charges of attempted murder.31 Indeed, stingray devices
appear to be widely used to track cell phones in drug and other criminal
investigations.32
Second, where police know a location of interest, investigators can use
a stingray to identify all mobile devices in the vicinity of that location in
real time.33 Police might rely on this use where, for example, they know the
physical location of a suspect in a criminal investigation, but they do not
know what phone she is using—perhaps because she frequently changes
devices by using “burner” phones.34 By positioning a stingray device in the
known vicinity of the suspect, investigators can collect the hardware
number of that suspect’s phone.
Importantly, in the course of either use, investigators will collect
information about not only a target’s cell phone but also all other cellular
devices in that area. This is because a stingray operates by tricking all
cellular devices in its vicinity to connect to it as they would to a real cell

Approach the Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134, 142–
43, 145–47 (2013).
28
Joh, supra note 12, at 104.
29
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 27, at 145.
30
See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How ‘Stingray’ Devices Work, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2011),
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/09/21/how-stingray-devices-work [https://perma.cc/A4PZ-CQTS].
31
State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
32
Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight, WIRED (Apr.
9, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-aircard [https://perma.cc/LHJ7-M2E7];
see also Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in Thousands of
Cases, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-mdci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html [https://perma.cc/94PE-5RNX] (reporting that Baltimore police
have acknowledged using a stingray device “4,300 times since 2007,” while “[t]he Florida Department
of Law Enforcement says its officers have used the device about 1,800 times”).
33
Valentino-DeVries, supra note 30.
34
See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 27, at 147. A “burner” phone is “a prepaid, inexpensive cell
phone intended for temporary use to communicate criminal activities while evading police detection.”
Abigail Hoverman, Note, Riley and Abandonment: Expanding Fourth Amendment Protection of Cell
Phones, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 551 (2017).
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phone tower.35 Moreover, a stingray device may interrupt service to other
devices in its vicinity.36
Beyond these basics, however, little is publicly known about stingray
devices, including about how they work and how often they are used. The
acquisition and use of stingray devices in individual cases is difficult to
track. To date, the ACLU has identified “72 agencies in 24 states and the
District of Columbia” as stingray owners.37 At the same time, the ACLU
asserts that that number “dramatically underrepresents the actual use of
stingrays by law enforcement agencies nationwide” because “many
agencies continue to shroud their purchase and use of stingrays in
secrecy.”38 The secrecy surrounding law enforcement use of stingrays has
also made it difficult to discover information about how exactly a stingray
device works or can be used.39
That secrecy is not merely a product of investigative intransigence or
“law enforcement privilege.”40 It is instead the deliberately sought outcome
of the primary manufacturer of stingray devices—Harris Corporation.41 For
many years, Harris sold stingray devices to federal investigators.42 When
Harris sought to expand sales to local law enforcement departments,
however, federal law required the Federal Communications Commission’s
(FCC) approval.43 And when Harris filed for the necessary authorization, it
requested that information about its devices “be treated as confidential and
withheld from public inspection.”44 Harris offered two reasons for this
request: that disclosure “could cause significant harm to federal, state, and

35

Pell & Soghoian, supra note 27, at 147–48.
Kim Zetter, Feds Admit Stingrays Can Disrupt Cell Service of Bystanders, WIRED (Mar. 1,
2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/03/feds-admit-stingrays-can-disrupt-cell-service-bystanders
[https://perma.cc/6AZ7-CGA2].
37
Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingraytracking-devices-whos-got-them [https://perma.cc/9KU5-YZX9].
38
Id.
39
See Robert Patrick, Controversial Secret Phone Tracker Figured in Dropped St. Louis Case, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
controversial-secret-phone-tracker-figured-in-dropped-st-louis-case/article_fbb82630-aa7f-5200-b221a7f90252b2d0.html [https://perma.cc/UVV3-3KQ7] (“The ability to track cellphones through their
service providers’ antenna network is commonly known and is openly discussed in court and on TV
shows. But the full capabilities of the StingRay are not clear.”).
40
On the history of the law enforcement privilege, see Stephen Wm. Smith, Policing Hoover’s
Ghost: The Privilege for Law Enforcement Techniques, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (2017).
41
See Joh, supra note 12, at 104.
42
Patrick, supra note 39.
43
Id.
44
Harris Letter, supra note 13.
36
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local law enforcement surveillance activities,” and that disclosure might
similarly “cause significant harm to . . . Harris’ competitive interests.”45
Despite identifying its competitive interests second, Harris devoted
the bulk of its confidentiality request to this interest. Harris explained that
public disclosure of information about stingrays “could compromise
Harris’ ability to sell and continue to develop the Stingray® product line”
because such disclosure “would provide other companies the opportunity to
reverse engineer the surveillance technology.”46 Emphasizing the “many
competitors that provide surveillance equipment to law enforcement
officials,” Harris pressed that “any disclosure . . . regarding the Stingray®
product would relinquish valuable proprietary information about how the
technology was developed and the manufacturing process.”47 And Harris
bluntly asserted that “[d]isclosure would result in substantial competitive
harm to Harris” and “would reveal Harris trade secrets.”48
Assuring the FCC that it had taken care to protect “proprietary aspects
of its equipment design and manufacturing processes,” Harris requested
that information about stingray devices “be withheld from public disclosure
until and unless Harris notifies the Commission that such information may
be publicly released.”49 To facilitate its request for confidentiality, Harris
proposed that it would market and sell its stingray devices to
“federal/state/local public safety and law enforcement officials only” and
that “[s]tate and local law enforcement agencies must advance coordinate
with the FBI the acquisition and use of equipment authorized under this
authorization.”50
The FCC granted Harris’s nondisclosure request, and the result has
been a raft of rigid nondisclosure agreements between the FBI and local
police departments.51 For instance, in order to acquire the Hailstorm device
at issue in Andrews, the Baltimore Police Department had to enter into a
nondisclosure agreement with the FBI,52 agreeing among other things not to
disclose the use of the Hailstorm device—even to a court, and even if it

45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See Joh, supra note 12, at 106.
52
State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 337–38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (describing the
nondisclosure agreement as a “condition of [Baltimore Police Department’s] purchase of” the Hailstorm
device).
46
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meant dropping charges all together.53 A similar nondisclosure agreement
signed by the Tucson Police Department prohibits the City of Tucson from
disclosing any information about its stingray use—even to “other
governmental entit[ies]”—without Harris’s prior written consent.54
Allocating the power to determine disclosure to Harris, rather than to a law
enforcement agency, reinforces the “competitive interest” rationale for
secrecy, while attenuating any relationship between nondisclosure and
legitimate law enforcement concerns. Similar nondisclosure agreements
have been unearthed for several other police departments around the
country.55
Pursuant to these nondisclosure obligations, police departments have
gone to great lengths to obscure their possession and use of stingray
devices. Prosecutors appear to have dropped charges rather than face
questions about stingray use.56 Investigators have also stymied court
overview of stingray use by obfuscating their use of the devices in court
documents. In Andrews, for instance, the court admonished the police
department for intentionally concealing its use of a stingray device from a
judge when seeking a court order to track the defendant.57 Moreover, likely
because of its nondisclosure agreement, “the State provided limited
information regarding the function and use” of the stingray device in
judicial hearings regarding the admissibility of information obtained
through its use.58

53
Id. at 338 (summarizing the nondisclosure agreement, including its instruction that “[i]f
necessary ‘the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore will, at the request of the FBI, seek dismissal
of the case in lieu of using or providing, or allowing others to provide, any information concerning the
Harris Corporation wireless collection equipment/technology’” (quoting Non-Disclosure Agreement
Between Ernest Reith, Acting Assistant Dir., Operational Tech. Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, and
Frederick H. Bealefeld, III, Police Comm’r, Balt. Police Dept. & Gregg L. Bernstein, Esq., State’s
Attorney, Office of the State’s Attorney for Balt. City ¶ 5 (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1808819/baltimore-police-stingray-non-disclosureagreement.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6PFZ-CFE3])).
54
Kim Zetter, Police Contract with Spy Tool Maker Prohibits Talking About Device’s Use, WIRED
(Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingray-nda [https://perma.cc/SCB4-C62B]
(quoting the nondisclosure agreement entered into by the City of Tucson, Arizona).
55
Joh, supra note 12, at 106–08 (discussing nondisclosure agreements with the police departments
of Baltimore, Maryland; Tucson, Arizona; and St. Louis, Missouri).
56
See Patrick, supra note 39 (“Just one day before a city police officer was to face questions about
a secret device used to locate suspects in a violent robbery spree, prosecutors dropped more than a
dozen charges against the three defendants.”). More broadly, Patrick reports, “[o]fficials across the U.S.
have been willing to drop cases rather than subject the technology to scrutiny by judges and defense
lawyers.” Id.
57
Andrews, 134 A.3d at 338–39.
58
Id. at 340.
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Private competitive concerns and assertions of trade secrecy thus have
impeded both courts and defendants from knowing, examining, or
effectively challenging how criminal cases are built or potential defendants
identified and investigated. Significantly, as in Andrews, secrecy
surrounding stingray use often shrouds investigative methods in mystery,
even though prosecutors may not seek to rely at trial on data generated by
the stingray device itself.59 These devices accordingly implicate different
criminal justice interests than tools designed to produce trial evidence
directly.
B. Secrecy in Prosecuting
Just as trade secret assertion pervades aspects of criminal
investigation, so too has it come to occupy a central role in the production
and presentation of key evidence for criminal trials. Two technologies
exemplify the growth, persistence, and effectiveness of trade secret
assertion surrounding the production of evidence: alcohol breath test
devices and probabilistic genotyping software. Together, these technologies
represent two generations of cases grappling with private trade secret
assertion in the context of criminal discovery.60
1. Alcohol Breath Test Devices
Among the most longstanding tools in this category are breath test
devices for measuring intoxication in drivers suspected of driving under the
influence. These devices connect a small tube to a portable computer.61
When a suspect blows into the tube, that air flows “into a chamber with an
infrared light and a sensor that’s designed to detect alcohol vapor through a
process called infrared spectrometry.”62 Breath test machines often sport
names designed to convey “mechanical objectivity,” like the
“Breathalyzer,” the “Drunk-O-Meter,” or the “Intoxilyzer.”63
59
Id. In Andrews, for instance, police used a stingray device to track Andrews to a specific
location, where a subsequent search (with a warrant) uncovered a gun nearby. Id. at 326. Andrews
argued that the gun should be suppressed as evidence tainted by the warrantless use of the stingray
device—as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. The location data generated by the stingray device directly
was not at issue because prosecutors did not seek to rely on that data during a trial.
60
See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 100.
61
See Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter: Court Won’t Release Breathalyzer Source Code, CNET
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.cnet.com/news/police-blotter-court-wont-release-breathalyzersource-code [https://perma.cc/G5XU-MFHC] (describing how breath test devices work).
62
Id.; see also In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d
525, 528 (Minn. 2012) (describing leading breath test device as “us[ing] infrared absorption
spectroscopy to measure the breath alcohol concentration of subjects who provide breath samples”).
63
Roth, supra note 11, at 1269. Importantly, these alcohol breath test devices are not the handheld
tools used by law enforcement officers to conduct field sobriety tests at the roadside. See Birchfield v.
North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2191 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“There is a common
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Like Harris, manufacturers of breath test devices have strenuously
resisted efforts to make information about their devices public or even
accessible to criminal defense experts.64 For instance, Draeger, which
manufactures the Alcotest, one popular breath test device, has refused to
sell its devices to non-law enforcement individuals for independent
testing,65 while asserting trade secrecy in its source code.66 In criminal
cases, CMI, Incorporated, the manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer, another
common breath test device, has repeatedly refused to disclose the source
code for its devices on trade secret grounds.67 Source code is the
“lifeblood” of a piece of software.68 It “dictates which tasks a program
performs, how the program performs the tasks, and the sequence in which
the program performs the tasks.”69
Most of the time, this assertion of trade secrecy has prevailed. Courts
have repeatedly vindicated manufacturers’ trade secret claims—directly or
indirectly—by refusing to grant defendants access to the source code of
breath test devices.70 In some cases, courts have explicitly acceded to
manufacturers’ assertions of trade secret protection.71 In others, courts have

misconception that breath tests are conducted roadside, immediately after a driver is arrested. While
some preliminary testing is conducted roadside, reliability concerns with roadside tests confine their use
in most circumstances to establishing probable cause for an arrest. The standard evidentiary breath test
is conducted after a motorist is arrested and transported to a police station, governmental building, or
mobile testing facility where officers can access reliable, evidence-grade breath testing machinery.”
(citations omitted)).
64
Defendants have also faced significant difficulty in assessing whether the data indicating their
intoxication is valid due to the paucity of data that many breath test devices actually produce for
inspection. The Intoxilyzer 8000, for instance, produces only a “printout card” reporting blood alcohol
concentration—it does not preserve any material that could be retested. See Roth, supra note 11, at
1271.
65
See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., THE UNTESTABLE DRUNK DRIVING TEST (2009). According to
Denbeaux and colleagues, Draeger has also prohibited the State of New Jersey, with which Draeger
holds an exclusive contract to supply alcohol breath test devices, from making any Draeger device
available for outside, independent testing.
66
State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008) (describing Draeger’s efforts to resist source code
disclosure).
67
See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 11; McCullagh, supra note 61.
68
Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id.
70
See id. at 100 (“With few exceptions, the clear majority of courts rejected defendants’ requests
that a defense expert be granted access to the program’s source code.” (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g.,
State v. Burnell, No. MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); Moe v.
State, 944 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681–82
(Crim. Ct. 2007). But see, e.g., State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 683–84 (Minn. 2009); State v.
Chun, 923 A.2d 226, 226–27 (N.J. 2007).
71
See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 110 (identifying courts in Connecticut, Florida, and New
York as denying access to source code on these bases); Chessman, supra note 16, at 205 (identifying
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denied defense discovery requests for the source code of a breath test
device on grounds that the state is not in possession of the relevant code
and so cannot disclose it.72
In Moe v. State, the Florida Court of Appeals cited both of these
rationales—and demonstrated their relatedness—in denying a defendant
access to the source code for Intoxilyzer 5000:
It is without dispute that the State does not have possession of the source code
because it is the property of CMI, Inc. It is also without dispute that the
code is a trade secret of CMI, Inc. and that CMI, Inc. has invoked its statutory
and common law privileges protecting the code from disclosure. Therefore,
the State cannot obtain possession of the code.73

The State of Florida appears to have deliberately persisted in its nonpossession of the relevant source code.74
Moreover, in some cases, CMI has refused to cooperate even where
courts have granted defense requests to examine the relevant source code.
In one group of Florida cases, CMI refused any disclosure until the courts,
whose orders CMI had flouted, levied fines against it totaling more than
$500,000.75 Similarly, CMI has refused to disclose its source code even
when that nondisclosure has prompted judges to dismiss charges.76
In the few cases where the disclosure of source code has successfully
been compelled, that disclosure has come only after much wrangling. In
Minnesota, for instance, the Department of Public Safety had to sue CMI
itself to gain access to the source code underlying the Intoxilyzer devices in
three primary bases for denying defendants access to source code, including that “the source code is a
trade secret”).
72
See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 110 (identifying a court in New York that denied access to
source code on this basis); Chessman, supra note 16, at 205 (identifying “the state does not possess the
source code” among the primary bases for denying defendants access to source code).
73
944 So. 2d at 1097; see also People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159, 167 (App. Div. 2008)
(explaining that “[t]he Intoxilyzer source code was not the property of the State, since it was owned and
copyrighted by its manufacturer, CMI, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, and is a trade secret of CMI, Inc.”
and discussing similar cases); Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (denying discovery because the source code
was “the property of a corporation that invoked statutory and common law privileges protecting the
code from disclosure, thereby making it unobtainable”).
74
See Chessman, supra note 16, at 214; Short, supra note 11, at 195 (“Florida, however, has made
no effort to obtain the source code itself so that it can ensure the reliability of the Intoxilyzer’s source
code. Indeed, when the state had the opportunity to write some form of source code access into its
contract with the manufacturer CMI, Inc., it declined to do so.” (footnotes omitted)).
75
See Short, supra note 11, at 183; Todd Ruger, Fines Rise in DUI Software Fight, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIBUNE (Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20080309/fines-rise-in-duisoftware-fight [https://perma.cc/2K85-443Y]. In light of those fines, CMI sought to arrange a
“controlled viewing” of its source code, coupled with a protective order and a nondisclosure agreement.
Ruger, supra.
76
See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 11.
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use throughout the state.77 CMI resisted that lawsuit as well, asserting once
again that “the source code itself contained proprietary trade secrets which
it would not disclose under any circumstances.”78
There is good reason for defendants to seek to examine the breath test
devices whose results are used to investigate, charge, and convict them. For
one thing, human programmers are the ones who encode breath test devices
with judgments about when and how to measure alcohol vapor and how to
convert that into a number signifying intoxication.79 Sometimes, those
judgments are wrong. For instance, one court observed that the Intoxilyzer
model at issue could give false positive results—indicating intoxication
where there is none—for individuals who suffer from diabetes, are on the
Adkins diet, or experience occupational exposure to certain paint thinners.80
These false positives are due not to inadvertent errors in programming but
rather to intentional judgments about how to measure alcohol in the
breath.81 A certain number of false positive results are the foreseeable
consequence of an imperfect methodology that measures compounds in the
breath without accounting for alternative (non-alcoholic) compounds that
may yield similar test results.82 Commentators have also observed that
breath test devices may give incorrect results if an individual either blows
insufficient air or blows for too long into the device.83 In this Goldilocks
scenario, an error may result from blowing too much or too little.
Sometimes, even if its science is sound, a machine may malfunction
for other reasons entirely. As developers identify bugs, patch them, and

77
See David Hanners, State Sues Breath-Test Machine Manufacturer, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.twincities.com/2008/03/03/state-sues-breath-test-machine-manufacturer
[https://perma.cc/CR6G-XFC9].
78
Id. (quoting Minnesota’s complaint (citation omitted)). Minnesota did not seek CMI’s source
code eagerly. It initiated litigation against CMI only after the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded, in
separate litigation, that the state was entitled to access the source code and that defendants were entitled
to examine it. See In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Minn. 2007).
79
See Roth, supra note 11, at 1270–71.
80
State v. Bastos, 985 So. 2d 37, 41–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Short, supra note 11, at 178.
81
See Bastos, 985 So. 2d at 41–42 (“[T]he machine is designed to examine only a portion of the
infrared spectrum. For that reason, it is unable to produce a ‘fingerprint’ identification of ethanol to the
exclusion of all other compounds. Instead, the machine is known to produce false positives. Examples
of this would be compounds produced by the body as a result of the Adkins diet or diabetes. Exposure
(usually occupational exposure) to certain paint thinners, lacquer, varnishes, and industrial cleaning
solvents can also produce false positives.”).
82
See id.
83
See Roth, supra note 11, at 1272 (observing that the Intoxilyzer 5000 could give “erroneous
‘deficient sample’ readings based on an artificially high breath-volume requirement”); Short, supra note
11, at 179–80 (“the longer an individual blows into the breath testing machine the higher the breath test
results can be” (footnote omitted)).
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perform other updates, they may introduce unintended errors.84 One group
of litigants discovered that the Intoxilyzer 8000 “was not properly
programmed to differentiate between residual alcohol in the mouth and
alcohol found in deep lung air, thus potentially leading to false positives.”85
In another case, independent analysis of the Draeger Alcotest 7110 found
that catastrophic error detection was disabled, “meaning that the Alcotest
software could appear to run correctly while executing wild branches or
invalid code for a period of time.”86 The analysts further concluded, “the
Alcotest software would not pass U.S. industry standards for software
development and testing.”87 In light of results like these, at least two states
have rejected use of the Intoxilyzer 8000, while other courts have, on
occasion, refused to admit its results at trial.88
2. Probabilistic Genotyping Software
Alcohol breath test devices are not the only tool prosecutors rely on
that inject private trade secret assertion into public criminal proceedings. A
newer entrant in this domain is probabilistic genotyping software, typified
by TrueAllele.89 TrueAllele was the first (and remains among the most
popular) of at least ten distinct software programs designed to “marshal[]
complex statistics” to complete DNA analysis that traditional methods
cannot.90 While some of these programs are open-source, meaning that their

84
See Ken Strutin, An Examination of Source Code Evidence, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 13, 2007),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005495696/An-Examination-of-Source-Code-Evidence
[https://perma.cc/Q6V8-UN7A]; see also Chessman, supra note 16, at 186–92 (identifying “structural
sources of error” that may unintentionally cause software to be unreliable or faulty, including
“accidental errors,” “software updates to legacy code,” and “software rot”).
85
Roth, supra note 11, at 1271.
86
Lawrence Taylor, Secret Breathalyzer Software Finally Revealed, DUI BLOG (Sept. 4, 2007),
http://www.duiblog.com/2007/09/04/secret-breathalyzer-software-finally-revealed
[https://perma.cc/5FXC-GZKC]; see also State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159 (N.J. 2008) (noting that the
Alcotest’s catastrophic error detection had been disabled in the firmware version 3.11, and that “if
utilized, it would ensure that the device would shut down if it encountered such an error”); Short, supra
note 11, at 185 (discussing Chun and the source code errors that independent analysis uncovered in the
Draeger Alcotest).
87
Taylor, supra note 86 (capitalization omitted).
88
See Roth, supra note 11, at 1272 nn.150–51 (observing that Alaska and Tennessee have declined
to certify the Intoxilyzer 8000, while at least one Ohio state court has refused to admit its results).
89
See Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 100 (noting the similarity of issues surrounding alcohol breath
test devices and advanced DNA-analysis tools like TrueAllele).
90
MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97; see also Roth, supra note 11, at 1262–63 (describing TrueAllele as
a “coup de grâce” for computerized genetic interpretation and observing that “several other companies
now have competing but similar software”).
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source code is freely available to the public, both TrueAllele and its
primary competitor, STRmix, are not.91
Traditionally, human analysts have “manually and visually
interpret[ed] DNA markers.”92 Where those methods of analysis fall
short—often with the most complex mixtures or degraded fragments of
DNA—probabilistic genotyping seeks to deliver answers. Probabilistic
genotyping software employs a “mathematical model[] that aim[s] to
predict when and why erratic observed results are nonetheless
explainable.”93 In so doing, such software “endeavor[s] to account for the
unpredictable behavior of DNA samples with low template or too many
contributors.”94
Mark Perlin, who created TrueAllele and sells it through his company
Cybergenetics, boasts that TrueAllele “can be applied to any DNA mixture,
always giving an answer.”95 Indeed, Perlin markets TrueAllele as a tool for
analyzing precisely those DNA samples that are most likely to yield
inconclusive results: samples containing DNA from multiple individuals

91
See Roth, supra note 20, at 2019 (“Some developers have opened their source code to the public;
others, such as Cybergenetics’s ‘TrueAllele’ program and New Zealand DNA expert John Buckleton’s
‘STRmix,’ have not.” (citations omitted)); Lauren Kirchner, Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails,
Algorithms Take Over, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/wheretraditional-dna-testing-fails-algorithms-take-over
[https://perma.cc/7CTW-BPPD]
[hereinafter
Kirchner, Algorithms Take Over]; see also PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 78–79 (“As of March
2014, at least 8 probabilistic genotyping software programs had been developed (called LRmix, Lab
Retriever, likeLTD, FST, Armed Xpert, TrueAllele, STRmix, and DNA View Mixture Solution), with
some being open source software and some being commercial products.”). Despite the fact that FST
was developed by the New York Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCME), that office has
repeatedly resisted efforts to examine FST’s source code in criminal cases. See Lauren Kirchner, Traces
of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evidence-new-york-disputedtechniques.html [https://perma.cc/DRN4-NLP3] [hereinafter Kirchner, Traces of Crime] (explaining
that, in response to defense counsel requests to examine FST’s source code, “the government refused to
hand it over on the grounds that it was a ‘proprietary and copyrighted’ statistical tool owned by the City
of New York”).
92
Kirchner, Algorithms Take Over, supra note 91.
93
MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97.
94
Id.
95
Letter from Mark W. Perlin, Chief Sci. & Exec. Officer, Cybergenetics, to Jerry D. Varnell, Fed.
Bureau of Investigation (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2015/may/
Letter_to_FBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W7D-EBNZ] [hereinafter Perlin Letter].
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(“mixture” samples)96 and samples containing very few cells (“low copy
number” samples).97 Perlin asserts that TrueAllele is “entirely objective.”98
Yet, as with claims about the function and accuracy of stingray and
alcohol breath test devices, Perlin’s claims about TrueAllele’s accuracy are
difficult to verify because Perlin has invoked the shroud of trade secrecy.
As in the Billy Ray Johnson case, Perlin has steadfastly refused to disclose
TrueAllele’s source code, even under protective order.99 Perlin explicitly
ties his nondisclosure to trade secrecy, writing that such secrecy is “needed
by companies to innovate essential technology in a competitive world.”100
And while Perlin and his colleagues have published a handful of validation
studies in peer-reviewed journals, even those did not make the underlying
data available for independent reviewers to assess.101 As set forth above, no
one outside of Perlin’s company has seen or examined TrueAllele’s source
code.102
Despite this lack of vigorous outside review, courts in at least ten
states have admitted TrueAllele’s results in criminal trials, while none have
ordered disclosure of TrueAllele’s source code.103 In many cases, courts
have relied on Perlin’s assertion of trade secret protection in declining to

96
See Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 2 (describing TrueAllele as “a computerized solution to the
DNA
mixture
problem”);
CYBERGENETICS,
https://www.cybgen.com/welcome.shtml
[https://perma.cc/SX5C-346A] (asserting, on Cybergenetics’ homepage, that TrueAllele “quickly and
reliably solves DNA mixtures”).
97
CYBERGENETICS, TRUEALLELE® CASEWORK SERVICES (2013), https://www.cybgen.com/
services/service_e-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR9N-WHF6] (brochure advertising TrueAllele and
asserting, under frequently asked questions, that “TrueAllele Casework technology work[s] with Low
Copy Number DNA”). In low copy number samples, the small number of available cells in a crime
scene sample typically provides too little DNA for accurate analysis.
98
Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 3.
99
Roth, supra note 11, at 1274; Wexler, supra note 1.
100
See Mark Perlin, Computers Are Helping Justice, CYBERGENETICS (June 16, 2017),
https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2017/jun/Cybergenetics-to-New-York-TimesComputers-are-helping-justice.shtml [https://perma.cc/PQ89-M5SN]. Perlin also declares that
“privileged information,” like that protected by trade secret law, “benefits society.” Id.
101
Roth, supra note 11, at 1274.
102
See MURPHY, supra note 8, at 101 (“Perlin admitted that no other scientists had seen his code or
reviewed it directly, and he stood by his refusal to make it available, defending it as a ‘trade secret.’”);
Robert Gavin, Cybergenetics True Allele Casework DNA Study is Winner in Cold Case Murder
Conviction, TIMES UNION (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/
Cybergenetics-True-Allele-Casework-DNA-study-is-6171690.php
[https://perma.cc/XU89-YQUL]
(“Only [Perlin] and one of his colleagues know the ‘source code’ behind [TrueAllele].”).
103
See TrueAllele Admissibility, CYBERGENETICS, https://www.cybgen.com/information/
admissibility/page.shtml [https://perma.cc/DJW2-69CA] (identifying cases admitting TrueAllele into
evidence in California, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Washington State).
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order source code disclosure.104 In the Billy Ray Johnson case, for instance,
the trial court concluded, “[t]he source code is a trade secret. I don’t think
adequate showing has been made to justify the breech [sic] of that
privilege.”105 In another case denying disclosure, the judge simply stated,
“[t]his source code is the intellectual property of Cybergenetics.”106
Ordering disclosure “would not be reasonable,” that court explained,
because it “would cause irreparable harm to the company, as other
companies would be able to copy the code and potentially put him out of
business.”107
To date, only one American court has compelled production of the
source code for probabilistic genotyping software in a criminal case. In
July 2016, a federal district court ordered New York City’s crime
laboratory to turn the source code of the lab’s in-house Forensic Statistical
Tool (“FST,” a probabilistic genotyping tool) over to a defense expert for
analysis.108 That expert concluded, “the correctness of the behavior of the
FST software should be seriously questioned.”109 Shortly thereafter, the
U.S. attorney’s office withdrew the FST-based DNA evidence in the
case.110 The crime lab later announced that it was discontinuing use of FST
altogether.111 Tellingly, however, the source code at issue in this case was
not privately developed. Rather, it was developed by the crime lab itself, in
the New York Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCME).112 As such, the

104
See Wexler, supra note 10, at 12 n.48 (collecting cases in which courts have denied defendants
access to source codes for probabilistic DNA-analysis software programs because the codes were
alleged to be trade secrets).
105
Respondent’s Brief at 73, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2017)
(quoting the trial court’s decision (citation omitted)).
106
Memorandum Order at 1, Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. C.P. Feb. 4,
2016).
107
Id. at 2
108
Order, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-00565 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016) (order denying
crime lab’s motion to quash source code subpoena); Memorandum in Support of Application by
ProPublica for Leave to Intervene, Lift the Protective Order and Unseal Judicial Records at 7, United
States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017) [hereinafter ProPublica
Memorandum].
109
Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91.
110
Id.
111
Id. The laboratory announced that, in place of FST, it would use the privately developed and
proprietary STRmix. Id.
112
Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica Seeks Source Code for New York City’s Disputed DNA Software,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-seeks-source-code-fornew-york-city-disputed-dna-software [https://perma.cc/MR26-SS26].
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software was not subject to the same kind of assertions of trade secrecy as
TrueAllele.113
As the FST case makes clear, like breath test and other devices, the
secrecy surrounding the details of how probabilistic genotyping software
works is cause for concern. At the most basic level, DNA analysis is not
the “crystal ball” it so often appears to be.114 While forensic genetic
analysis rests on a scientifically sound basis,115 its use in practice has been
riddled with errors.116 There are dozens of known scandals involving
mistaken, sloppy, or fraudulent casework.117 Even if every crime scene
investigator and lab analyst performs their work flawlessly, the resulting
analysis may be inconclusive, unhelpful, or incorrect. This is because crime
scene DNA is typically not a pristine sample. Instead, “[c]rime scene
testing . . . is like seeking results from [a] dirty Band-Aid—after it has been
in the trash for two weeks.”118 Such samples “may have been exposed to
light, heat, moisture, or chemicals that can compromise the ability to get
results.”119
For its part, TrueAllele claims to mitigate these pitfalls by automating
the DNA “interpretation process to give accurate and reliable answers,”120
113
Of course, the OCME nonetheless repeatedly resisted efforts to examine FST’s source code in
criminal cases. See Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91. Disclosure of FST’s source code was
originally subject to a protective order. See ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108, at 7 (recounting
the procedural history of this case). That protective order was subsequently vacated. Order, United
States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017) (order unsealing most records
previously sealed or redacted); see also Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime
Lab’s
Software
for
Analyzing
DNA
Evidence,
PROPUBLICA
(Oct.
20,
2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-crime-labs-software-for-analyzingdna-evidence [https://perma.cc/NES4-Y82W].
114
Natalie Ram, Book Review, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIS. 426, 427 (2016) (reviewing MURPHY, supra note
8); see MURPHY, supra note 8, at 311 (concluding that “DNA testing is neither savior nor cure-all; it is
just another form of proof deserving of careful attention”).
115
See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEED OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 133 (2009)
[hereinafter NAS REPORT] (providing multiple reasons why DNA testing is scientifically sound).
116
See generally MURPHY, supra note 8 (documenting how DNA is collected, analyzed, disclosed,
and used in criminal investigations and trials, and exposing its repeated documented scandals and
errors).
117
Ram, supra note 114, at 429; see MURPHY, supra note 8, at 53–73 (describing insufficient
internal audit procedures, proficiency testing, oversight by forensic laboratory accreditation
organizations, and quality assurance protocols, as well as inadequate laboratory resources, training, and
even qualified supervisory personnel at numerous forensics laboratories throughout the United States).
For instance, Murphy reports that deceptive behavior by lab analysts—“suggesting work was performed
that actually was not—has occurred so many times that there is a word for it: dry-labbing.” MURPHY,
supra note 8, at 68.
118
MURPHY, supra note 8, at 19.
119
Id.
120
Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 3.
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but that is not a complete response. For one thing, TrueAllele is marketed
for use in the types of cases most likely to suffer from laboratory errors,
even under the best of circumstances—those involving mixtures and low
copy number samples.121 As Professor Erin Murphy has explained, “when
low quantities of DNA are tested, the potential for contamination runs
high.”122 An imperfectly cleaned workspace or an analyst’s accidental
sneeze at the wrong moment may introduce foreign cells into an alreadycomplex mixture or low copy number sample, confounding accurate
analysis of the number of contributors and their distinct genetic profiles in
the original sample.123 More broadly, the factors giving rise to mistaken,
sloppy, or fraudulent lab work are likely to be as significant, if not worse,
where complex mixtures or low copy number samples are involved.
Moreover, while Perlin claims that TrueAllele is equally capable of
“resolv[ing] DNA mixtures without any limitation on the number of
contributing individuals,”124 the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology disagrees.125 In a recent report, that Council concluded that
TrueAllele is reliable only “within a certain range, based on the available
evidence and the inherent difficulty of the problem.”126 Specifically,
TrueAllele was determined to be reliable for, at best, “three-person
mixtures in which the minor contributor constitutes at least 20 percent of
the intact DNA in the mixture” and in two-person mixtures where the
minor contributor accounts for at least 10 percent of the available DNA.127
Unfortunately, these thresholds may be unknown in many cases,
particularly those involving degraded DNA evidence not susceptible to
traditional analysis. Indeed, based on TrueAllele’s marketing for and use in
cases involving complex samples, one member of a forensic committee that
121

See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
MURPHY, supra note 8, at 76. (describing difficulties with low copy number samples).
123
Id. at 77.
124
Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 4.
125
See PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 80 n.215 (noting that “the interpretation of DNA
mixtures becomes increasingly challenging as the number of contributors increases”).
126
Id. at 80. The Report issued the same findings for STRmix. Id.
127
Id. at 80 & n.216. In these cases, the Council observed that the mixtures involve “similar
proportions” of DNA, which “are more straightforward to interpret owing to the limited number of
alleles and relatively similar peak height.” Id. at 80 n.216. Where a crime scene sample contains a
mixture of DNA from multiple individuals, a “minor” contributor is an individual whose DNA is
present as a small proportion of the total available DNA in the sample. See KEITH INMAN & NORAH
RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 113 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining difficulties
encountered in PCR when samples contain DNA from two or more people). If the disparity between
major and minor DNA contributors becomes too great, this can make it difficult to assess the presence
of the minor contributor and impossible to accurately identify the minor contributor’s DNA profile. Id.
Cases with a smaller number of contributors and larger proportions of minor contributor DNA are less
likely to suffer from these defects. PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 80 n.216.
122
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approved TrueAllele for use in New York in 2011 subsequently retracted
that support.128
Even beyond the difficulties of working with complex samples,
automating forensic interpretation does not render it free of human error
and subjectivity. For instance, Perlin has altered TrueAllele’s source code
more than twenty-five times.129 Yet, Perlin has given no explanation about
what has been altered or why,130 and it is impossible to know whether those
changes corrected undisclosed errors or inadvertently introduced new
ones.131 Moreover, as with alcohol breath test devices, TrueAllele and other
probabilistic genotyping software are the product of human judgments
about how to interpret complex data inputs.132 As set forth above,
probabilistic genotyping software rely on mathematical models to attempt
“to account for the unpredictable behavior of DNA samples with low
template or too many contributors.”133 But each such software package, in
attempting to do the same thing, uses a somewhat different mathematical
model or codes for that model differently.134 The consequence is that these

128
Order at 16, Ohio v. Shaw, No. CR-13-575691 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 10, 2014) (describing
testimony by expert Dr. Ranjit Chakraborty that TrueAllele no longer had wide acceptance in his field
and that he believed its applications for cases with closed sources and unknown application of variables
still needed to be worked out). Chakraborty served as a member of the Scientific Working Group on
DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), which establishes national guidelines for forensic laboratories in
the United States. Katherine L. Moss, Note, The Admissibility of TrueAllele: A Computerized
Interpretation System, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033, 1069 (2015). Chakraborty explained that the
New York approval of which he had been a part “only extended to TrueAllele testing a higher quantity
of DNA from a single source.” Id. Moreover, Chakraborty asserted that “an independent party could not
recreate or validate TrueAllele results without the source code.” Id. at 1070.
129
Roth, supra note 11, at 1273.
130
Id.
131
See supra text accompanying note 84.
132
See MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97–98 (explaining that this type of software reflects how
scientists and statisticians understand complex samples to behave, and that different software packages
give weight to different factors and consequently may produce different results).
133
Id. at 97.
134
See PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 79 n. 211 (“Some programs use discrete (semicontinuous) methods, which use only allele information in conjunction with probabilities of allelic
dropout and dropin, while other programs use continuous methods, which also incorporate information
about peak height and other information. Within these two classes, the programs differ with respect to
how they use the information. Some of the methods involve making assumptions about the number of
individuals contributing to the DNA profile, and use this information to clean up noise (such as ‘stutter’
in DNA profiles).”); see also MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97 (software packages rely on mathematical
models that “differ in their details, and as a result the predictions they make as regard the same piece of
evidence may differ as well”); Roth, supra note 20, at 1996 (“Even if a programmer is not ‘biased’ in
the sense of making choices to further a preconceived goal, her analytically controversial choices can
affect the accuracy of the machine’s scores and estimates. For example, in the DNA context,
programmers have the power to set thresholds for what to count as a true genetic marker versus noise in
determining which markers to report on the graphs used in determining a match.”); Wexler, supra note
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supposedly “entirely objective”135 tools, when tested side by side,
sometimes yield different results.136
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
concluded that probabilistic genotyping represents a significant and
welcome advance in the science.137 But it also urged caution and study
when making use of these new tools.138 Unfortunately, Perlin’s persistent
and vociferous assertions of trade secrecy surrounding TrueAllele make
study more difficult and caution more urgent.
As experience with alcohol breath test devices and probabilistic
genotyping software make plain, algorithmic tools for generating crucial
evidence of guilt or innocence are multiplying and taking on increased
importance. Where these tools are privately developed and shielded by
assertions of trade secrecy, however, reliability and validity may be
difficult, if not impossible, to verify. In the few cases in which courts have
compelled disclosure of private source code for alcohol breath test devices,
reviewers identified significant errors in almost every instance.139 In the one
instance in which a court has compelled source code disclosure of
probabilistic genotyping software, the State shortly thereafter abandoned
use of that tool.140 The lack of broader access to source code—particularly
for probabilistic genotyping software, about which scientific experts have
expressed doubts regarding validity and reliability—is therefore deeply
troubling.
10, at 23 (“[S]oftware developers must therefore choose not only how to implement a statistical model
through code but also which model of the underlying biological phenomena to use.”).
135
Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 3.
136
See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 8, at 97 (“These models differ in their details, and as a result the
predictions they make as regard the same piece of evidence may differ as well.”); PCAST REPORT,
supra note 17, at 79 n.212 (describing an ongoing case in which STRmix and TrueAllele gave
conflicting results); Roth, supra note 11, at 1273–74 (“[I]n conference simulations involving
hypothetical mixtures, TrueAllele and several competing programs have come to different results in
terms of guessing mixture ratios.”); Wexler, supra note 10, at 23–24 (“Competing software programs
have been found to produce divergent results from identical test samples. In a recent child homicide
case, two software programs reached different conclusions regarding whether a defendant’s DNA was
included in a crime scene sample.” (citations omitted)).
137
PCAST REPORT, supra note 17.
138
Id. (“However, [these probabilistic genotyping software programs] still require careful scrutiny
to determine (1) whether the methods are scientifically valid, including defining the limitations on their
reliability (that is, the circumstances in which they may yield unreliable results) and (2) whether the
software correctly implements the methods.”); id. (“Appropriate evaluation of the proposed methods
should consist of studies by multiple groups, not associated with the software developers, that
investigate the performance and define the limitations of programs by testing them on a wide range of
mixtures with different properties.”).
139
See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text.
140
Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91 (“Earlier this year, the lab shelved [probabilistic
genotyping software] and replaced [it] with newer, more broadly used technology.”).
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C. Secrecy in Sentencing
Finally, privately developed criminal justice algorithms, shielded from
disclosure by assertions of trade secret protection, have extended their
reach even into criminal sentencing. Most prominently, courts have begun
to make sentencing determinations based, at least in part, on recidivism
scores generated by software whose weights and measures are, once again,
not disclosed on trade secret grounds.141
In July 2016, State v. Loomis became the first appellate case to
address the relationship between asserted private trade secret protection and
due process principles in sentencing.142 In that case, Eric Loomis pled guilty
to fleeing the police and driving a stolen car.143 The trial court’s presentence report included a recidivism risk score generated by a program
called COMPAS, and Loomis was deemed at high risk of committing
another crime.144 Citing Loomis’s COMPAS score, the court sentenced
Loomis to six years of imprisonment.145 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed that sentence.146 In so doing, the court rejected Loomis’s argument
that a sentence based on a COMPAS score violates due process “because
the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging
the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity.”147 So long as the COMPAS
score is not the only factor on which a judge relies at sentencing, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of such scores in deciding
whether and for how long a defendant should be incarcerated.148
COMPAS, a privately developed proprietary tool owned and sold by
Northpointe, Inc., is among the most widely used recidivism risk

141

E.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
See id.; U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *22 (“The United States is not aware of any federal
court of appeals or state court of last resort, other than the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that has
confronted the federal due process issues that petitioner raises here.”).
143
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754.
144
Id. at 754–55; Ethan Chiel, Secret Algorithms that Predict Future Criminals Get a Thumbs Up
from Wisconsin Supreme Court, FUSION (July 27, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/330672/algorithmsrecidivism-loomis-wisconsin-court [https://perma.cc/73ZZ-X7PQ].
145
Chiel, supra note 144.
146
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 772.
147
Id. at 753. Loomis also argued that sentencing based on a COMPAS score violates due process
“because COMPAS assessments take gender into account.” Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected
this argument as well.
148
Id. at 753 (“We determine that because the circuit court explained that its consideration of the
COMPAS risk scores was supported by other independent factors, its use was not determinative in
deciding whether Loomis could be supervised safely and effectively in the community. Therefore, the
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.”).
142
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assessment algorithms in the United States.149 COMPAS generates
recidivism scores based principally on an interview with a defendant, as
well as information recorded in the defendant’s criminal file.150 COMPAS
is designed to measure both “static” variables, like a defendant’s age at first
arrest and family criminal history, and “dynamic variables,” including
personal beliefs and criminal associates.151 After analyzing these data,
COMPAS generates three risk scores, one each for “pretrial recidivism,”
“general recidivism,” and “violent recidivism,”152 which are reported on a
10-point bar chart.153 That score is designed to represent a relative risk; that
is, defendants with higher scores are deemed at higher risk of reoffending
than other individuals in the same “norm group.”154
Critically, defendants, defense counsel, departments of corrections,
and courts who make use of COMPAS scores do not know how those
scores are generated.155 That is, although Northpointe has disclosed the 137question survey that provides informational input for its program, it has
refused to disclose how that information is used or weighted to arrive at a
particular recidivism risk score.156 This is because Northpointe, which
149

Julia
Angwin
et
al.,
Machine
Bias,
PROPUBLICA
(May
23,
2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/4CXA-Z5VK ]. In addition to COMPAS, “[t]here are dozens of these risk assessment
algorithms in use. Many states have built their own assessments, and several academics have written
tools. There are also two leading nationwide tools offered by commercial vendors,” of which COMPAS
is one. Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23,
2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm
[https://perma.cc/Y9FF-EJHV]. Not all of these tools are shrouded by trade secrecy; indeed, several
states have “develop[ed] and validat[ed] publicly available risk-assessment measures for consideration
at sentencing.” U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17 n. 5.
150
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754, 761 (describing Northpointe’s explanation about the information
inputs used to generate COMPAS scores).
151
See id. at 761; Katherine Freeman, Note, Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin Supreme
Court Failed To Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 75, 79,
92 (2016).
152
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754.
153
Id.; Freeman, supra note 151, at 81.
154
See Freeman, supra note 151, at 81–82; see also Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 754. Northpointe has
identified eight norm subgroups: “(1) male prison/parole, (2) male jail, (3) male probation, (4) male
composite, (5) female prison/parole, (6) female jail, (7) female probation, and (8) female composite.”
Freeman, supra note 151, at 81 (quoting NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 11
(2015), http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core_031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-ZVAV]).
155
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761 (“[Northpointe] does not disclose how the risk scores are
determined or how the factors are weighed.”); Chiel, supra note 144 (“The Wisconsin Supreme Court
doesn’t care that the software is considered a proprietary trade secret, because the program’s
‘Practitioner Guide’ includes some of the types of data that are part of the assessment . . . . In other
words, what’s relevant according to the court is knowing what goes in, not how it’s weighted.”).
156
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761; Freeman, supra note 151, at 80 (describing the survey).
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created and distributes COMPAS, claims that COMPAS is proprietary and
a trade secret.157 As in cases involving TrueAllele, the Intoxilyzer, and
Harris’s family of stingray technology, trade secret assertion obscures
significant information about how data intended to inform criminal justice
processes has been generated.
That secrecy affects not only defendants and their counsel but also the
courts whose sentences COMPAS scores may inform. Northpointe’s
assertion of trade secret protection has left each of these criminal justice
participants similarly in the dark. As one judge observed in Loomis’s case,
“this court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS was a significant problem
in the instant case. At oral argument, the court repeatedly questioned both
the State’s and defendant’s counsel about how COMPAS works. Few
answers were available.”158
Northpointe’s secrecy may be of further concern, as COMPAS’s use
in cases like Loomis’s applies the software beyond its intended use.
COMPAS was originally designed to aid the Department of Corrections in
making placement decisions, managing offenders, and planning
treatment.159 The pre-sentence report in Loomis’s case specifically
instructed, “risk scores are not intended to determine the severity of the
sentence or whether an offender is incarcerated.”160 Yet, as Loomis’s case
illustrates, judges have based a sentence of imprisonment, or the length of
such a sentence, at least in part on the scores that COMPAS generates.
To be sure, the use of data and algorithms in sentencing may not
always be problematic. Draft revisions to the Model Penal Code, for
instance, “encourage[e] the use of actuarial risk-assessment tools at
sentencing.”161 Indeed, algorithmic tools may “offer better predictions of
future behavior than the clinical judgments of treatment professionals such
as psychiatrists and psychologists, or the intuitions of criminal-justice
professionals such as judges and probation officers.”162
But better predictions are only possible if such tools are, as the
revisions note, “well-designed.”163 Unfortunately, there may be good reason
157
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761(“Northpointe, Inc., the developer of COMPAS, considers
COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade secret.”).
158
Id. at 774 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
159
Id. at 754 (citing NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1 (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technicaldocuments/Practitioners–Guide–COMPAS–Core–
031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGZ2-ZVAV]).
160
Id. at 755 (emphasis omitted).
161
MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3 2014) (summarizing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 6B:09(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2 2011)).
162
Id.
163
Id.
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to question COMPAS’s design. Emerging evidence indicates that
COMPAS is racially biased, generating higher recidivism scores for blacks
than for similarly situated whites.164 In one recent study, ProPublica authors
analyzed the COMPAS scores for more than 7,000 people arrested in 2013
and 2014, comparing these scores to the actual incidence of recidivism for
those individuals.165 The authors concluded that COMPAS scores were
unreliable predictors of violent crime in particular: “Only 20 percent of the
people predicted to commit violent crimes actually went on to do so.”166
Perhaps more troubling, “[t]he formula was particularly likely to falsely
flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way
at almost twice the rate as white defendants,” while “[w]hite defendants
were mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants.”167
Determining how these algorithmic disparities arise is difficult.168 It is
impossible to do so when the formula that undergirds that disparity is
hidden from view. Yet that is precisely what Northpointe’s assertion of
trade secret protection does.
II. THE HARMS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECRECY
Reliance on trade secrecy in the development of criminal justice tools
imposes real harms on the criminal justice process. Those harms are of both
practical and potentially constitutional dimensions. This Part first explains
why access to source code is often essential to confirm the validity and
reliability of criminal justice technologies—and why alternative
mechanisms for ensuring these features are likely to fall short in this arena.
It next identifies two additional practical harms of reliance on trade secrecy
in this arena: diminished public confidence in algorithmic quality and less
innovation to create better algorithms. Finally, this Part briefly explores the
constitutional costs of criminal justice secrecy.
A. The Importance of Access to Code
Source code secrecy surrounding criminal justice algorithms imposes
significant practical harms on the criminal justice system. Chief among
164
See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 763 (“[T]here is concern that risk assessment tools may
disproportionately classify minority offenders as higher risk, often due to factors that may be outside
their control, such as familial background and education.”); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-incriminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/KL7Q-FL25].
165
Angwin et al., supra note 164.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
At a minimum, Angwin and other authors concluded that this disparity was not due to
“defendants’ prior crimes or the type of crimes they were arrested for.” Id.
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these is that such secrecy may give rise to worse algorithms by impeding
effective oversight of the validity and reliability of these tools.
Secret code is often less good code. Outside experts repeatedly have
identified algorithmic weaknesses and outright errors in proprietary source
code revealed in litigation. For instance, outside expert review of the source
code of New York City’s FST concluded that “the correctness of the
behavior of the FST software should be seriously questioned.”169 Similarly,
access to the source code for an Intoxilyzer model in use in Minnesota
revealed that a “deficient sample” report could indicate a software
failure.170 Based on that information, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the categorical exclusion of such reports, absent other evidence
indicating that a software error was not at fault.171 When source code
review of Draeger’s Alcotest device in New Jersey revealed that
catastrophic error detection was disabled, the state supreme court required
its correction.172 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court required other
firmware changes, including that only the manufacturer be able to alter the
device software and excluding state “coordinators.”173
More broadly, research indicates that open-source software—software
whose source code is freely available to anyone—has fewer errors than
proprietary software.174 “[P]ublic access to open source codes” thus

169
See Kirchner, supra note 112. Relatedly, a partial inspection of the source code of STRmix,
another popular probabilistic genotyping program, revealed a “minor miscode”—one that affected the
reported likelihood of a DNA match in at least sixty cases. David Murray, Queensland Authorities
Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, THE COURIER-MAIL (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/queensland-authorities-confirm-miscode-affects-dnaevidence-in-criminal-cases/news-story/833c580d3f1c59039efd1a2ef55af92b [https://perma.cc/SA2X85LF]; see also Chessman, supra note 16, at 188–89 (discussing this case); Rebecca Wexler, Convicted
by
Code,
SLATE
(Oct.
6,
2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/10/06/
defendants_should_be_able_to_inspect_software_code_used_in_forensics.html
[https://perma.cc/Z37Q-UHVU] (“Coding errors have been found to alter DNA likelihood ratios by a
factor of 10, causing prosecutors in Australia to replace 24 expert witness statements in criminal
cases.”).
170
See In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 543
(Minn. 2012).
171
Id.
172
See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159 (N.J. 2008) (“[W]e direct that the State arrange to have
the software corrected to re-enable the catastrophic error detection feature.”).
173
Id. at 160–61.
174
See SYNOPSYS, INC., COVERITY® SCAN OPEN SOURCE REPORT 2014, at 4 (2015),
http://go.coverity.com/rs/157-LQW-289/images/2014-Coverity-Scan-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7GU-RUQB] (reporting that “[o]pen source software has a considerably lower
defect density than commercial software”); Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Coverity Finds Open Source
Software Quality Better than Proprietary Code, ZDNET (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/
coverity-finds-open-source-software-quality-better-than-proprietary-code
[perma.cc/R9CY-V2Q7]
(discussing Coverity’s 2013 report).
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“facilitates further investigation and validation of technology.”175 Thus,
access to source code is often essential for defendants to verify that the
algorithms that have led to their arrest, conviction, or sentence operate as
intended.
Other mechanisms intended to ensure the accuracy, validity, and
reliability of criminal justice algorithms fall short in the absence of outside
source code review. 176 For instance, one group of authors has counseled
reliance on validation studies to ensure accuracy and fairness.177 Validation
studies are empirical tests designed to establish that the software or device
functions as claimed.178 For these scholars, “it is significantly less important
for judges to pry open this black box than it is for them to establish whether
its operation has been tested under conditions similar to those at issue in
court.”179
But reliance on validation studies in place of source code access,
rather than alongside it, is likely insufficient to verify that software has
performed as its designer claims. In part, this stems from the limited
verification that can be gleaned from “black-box testing”—testing that
“considers only the inputs and outputs of a system or component.”180 As
technologists have explained, “[c]omputer scientists . . . have shown that
black-box evaluation of systems is the least powerful of a set of available
methods for understanding and verifying system behavior.”181 More
powerful and effective is “white-box testing,” in which “the person doing a
test can see the system’s code and uses that knowledge to more effectively
search for bugs.”182 Accordingly, researchers have concluded that, to enable
175

Freeman, supra note 151, at 102.
In some instances, like the use of a stingray device to locate and arrest an individual, concerns
are less about accuracy and reliability than about privacy. Moreover, concerns about nondisclosure of
stingray use even to the judges themselves are orthogonal to the accuracy and reliability issues
discussed in here. For more on these concerns, see infra Section II.B. Where a prosecutor seeks to
introduce at trial information generated by a stingray device, however, the same concerns about the
accuracy, reliability, and fairness of the source code at issue may arise. See infra note 216.
177
See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 120 (concluding that it is “correct—sometimes” that “a
review of available validation studies allows an opponent to determine whether a computer program
contains deficiencies without access to the source code” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jennifer
Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science,
5 EPISTEME 343, 344–45 (2008) (arguing that, for admissibility, the “inquiry should focus first and
foremost on validation—or, more precisely, on the extent to which appropriate empirical testing
supports the claims made by the expert—rather than on whether the expert (or, more broadly, the
community of experts) can offer a plausible account of the underlying mechanism at work”).
178
See Mnookin, supra note 177, at 344.
179
Id. at 344–45.
180
Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 633, 650 (2017).
181
Id. at 661.
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Id.
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effective scientific inquiry, “anything less than the release of source
programs is intolerable for results that depend on computation.”183
The limitations on the insight gleaned from validation testing are
exacerbated in the criminal justice arena by the nature of the validation
studies on which software developers have principally relied. Many of
these validation studies are the product of in-house testing. Of the journal
articles touted on Cybergenetics’s website, all but two include Perlin—
TrueAllele’s creator and Cybergenetics’s Chief Scientific and Executive
Officer—as an author.184 Similarly, Northpointe’s own employees
conducted most of the validation studies on which Northpointe has relied in
advocating for COMPAS’s accuracy.185 By contrast, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, in its report on forensic
science in criminal courts, recommended that “[a]ppropriate evaluation of
the proposed methods should consist of studies by multiple groups, not
associated with the software developers.”186
Moreover, existing validation studies are often the product of
“idealized conditions unrepresentative of the challenges of real
casework.”187 For example, advanced algorithmic tools, like probabilistic
genotyping software, are most likely to be called upon “in cases involving
less-than-ideal conditions—degraded or highly complex mixtures difficult
for human analysts to interpret.”188 Thus, validation studies are not a viable
alternative to outside source code review for ensuring reliability and
accountability; rather, validation alongside outside source code review is
needed.
Building accountability into digital design also is unlikely to be a
practical solution to ensuring accuracy and reliability in the absence of
outside source code review—at the very least with respect to privately
developed technologies already in use. Proponents of accountability by
design argue that, rather than merely disclose source code for outside
183

Darrel C. Ince et al., The Case for Open Computer Programs, 482 NATURE 485, 485 (2012).
See
CYBERGENETICS,
Publications,
https://www.cybgen.com/information/publication/
page.shtml [http://perma.cc/3YYH-Z8Y9].
185
See Freeman, supra note 151, at 82–83.
186
PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 79. Accordingly, many current validation studies may fail to
satisfy even those scholars most predisposed to accept them, as even those who would accept validation
studies alone correctly note that such acceptance is a function of the studies’ quality. See Imwinkelried,
supra note 8, at 120.
187
Roth, supra note 20, at 2033.
188
Id. at 1982. Even scholars who are inclined, in principle, to support refusals to disclose source
code for criminal justice algorithms recognize that disclosure becomes more necessary as “the test
conditions and the conditions in the instant case” increasingly diverge. Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at
120; see also id. at 123–24 (proposing a “range of validation” for assessing the sufficiency of validation
studies).
184
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review, software designers should “publish[] commitments and us[e] zeroknowledge proofs to ensure that commitments correspond to the system’s
decisionmaking actions.”189 For these technologists, neither source code
transparency nor validation studies are sufficient to ensure accuracy and
fairness.190 Designing for accountability, by contrast, “can enable
stakeholders to reach accountability goals that could not be achieved by
imposing new transparency requirements on existing system designs.”191
But while designing for accountability might be a worthy aspiration, it
is unlikely to mitigate the need for source code access in the near or
medium term. There is little evidence that existing tools have adopted such
measures. More stubbornly, there is often a lack of consensus about what
decision-guiding properties criminal justice algorithms ought to adopt. For
instance, as set forth above, scientists and software developers have yet to
reach agreement about which mathematical model best resolves complex
DNA mixtures.192 Defining a usable principle of “fairness” in sentencing is
likely to be every bit as challenging, if not more so.193 Thus, it is far from
clear that designing for accountability is a practical solution, particularly
for tools already in use like stingrays, the Intoxilyzer, TrueAllele, and
COMPAS.
Significantly, even the technologists who eschew calls for source code
transparency ultimately make one themselves. In their final conclusions,
these authors recommend that policymakers “incentivize nongovernmental
actors to use” techniques of designing for accountability.194 The stick for
not doing so? “[R]equiring transparency—at least to courts—of code and
inputs if they do not employ such technical tools.”195 In other words,
outside access to source code is and remains a key component of ensuring
the accuracy, validity, and reliability of criminal justice algorithms.

189
Kroll et al., supra note 180, at 682. “A zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic tool that allows
a decisionmaker, as part of a cryptographic commitment, to prove that the decision policy that was
actually used (or the particular decision reached in a certain case) has a certain property, but without
having to reveal either how that property is known or what the decision policy actually is.” Id. at 668.
190
Id. at 646–53; see id. at 657–60 (2017) (discussing “Transparency and Its Limits” and
describing “transparency of the source code as well as inputs and outputs for the relevant decisions” as
a “naive solution to the problem of verifying procedural regularity”).
191
Id. at 637.
192
See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
193
See Kroll et al., supra note 189, at 696.
194
Id. at 705.
195
Id.
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B. Other Practical Harms of Criminal Justice Secrecy
In addition to undermining the overall quality of code, shielding
source code from outside scrutiny may also inflict other practical harms on
the criminal justice system. For one thing, source code secrecy can
undermine public confidence in that quality. A lack of confidence is
understandable; in recent years, outside review has exposed numerous
previously well-regarded forensic sciences as unreliable or scientifically
unsound.196 Forensic arson investigation, bite mark analysis, bullet lead
examination, hair analysis, and even fingerprint analysis have been
criticized or even discontinued in light of a lack of scientific evidence or
reliability.197 It is similarly unclear whether recidivism risk statistics spring
from a scientifically sound basis.198 And there is little reason to believe that
new methods of breath or DNA analysis, though originating from sound
science, are free from methodological or coding error.
Insofar as access to source code is significant in assuring the validity
and reliability of such analyses—and it is199—lack of access to source code
may reasonably undermine public and judicial confidence in these criminal
justice tools. By contrast, source code access can increase judicial and
public confidence in otherwise abstruse technology. When the New Jersey
Supreme Court approved continued use of the state’s alcohol breath test
devices following full review of the device’s source code, the court
emphasized that its “evaluation of the exhaustive record relating to the
source code leaves us confident that its errors have been revealed.”200
Finally, lack of source code access may inhibit innovation of better
software and other criminal justice tools. As a general matter, when it
comes to incentives for innovation, American law has typically preferred
information-forcing policies, like patents, over information-shielding ones,
like trade secrecy.201 Among other benefits provided by information-forcing
196
See NAS REPORT, supra note 115, at 8 (“[T]here is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed,
published studies establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic methods.”); Ram, supra
note 114, at 427.
197
Ram, supra note 114, at 427–28 (summarizing the state of forensic science).
198
See Angwin et al., supra note 164 (finding that risk scores “proved remarkably unreliable in
forecasting violent crime: Only 20 percent of the people predicted to commit violent crimes actually
went on to do so”).
199
See supra Section II.A.
200
State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 151, 160 (N.J. 2008).
201
See Price, supra note 23, at 1779–80. The disclosure requirement for patents, compared with the
secrecy required for trade secret protection, is not the only way in which patent and trade secret law
differ. See id. at 1774–83; infra Section III.A. Indeed, scholars debate whether disclosure can justify the
monopoly rights that the patent system creates. Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure,
94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2009) (arguing for the “centrality in the patent system” of disclosure), with
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (“Disclosure
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policies, disclosure is thought to spur follow-on innovation.202 Far less
innovation can flow from secret information, like the proprietary source
code that Harris, CMI, Cybergenetics, and Northpointe are at pains to
protect. Thus, criminal justice secrecy not only inhibits a defendant from
ensuring that he is not wrongly identified, convicted, or sentenced; it may
“prevent[] the technology from potentially advancing.”203
In sum, lack of access to source code yields lower quality code, lower
confidence in that code, and less follow-on innovation to create better code.
C. Constitutional Concerns About Criminal Justice Secrecy
Trade secret assertion in the context of criminal justice tools also
raises constitutional concerns. Secrecy surrounding the existence, use, and
function of criminal justice tools interferes with defendants’ and courts’
efforts to ensure that the government does not engage in unreasonable
searches. Such secrecy is also at least in tension with, if not in violation of,
defendants’ ability to vindicate their due process interests throughout the
criminal justice process, as well as their confrontation rights at trial. A
comprehensive constitutional argument, much less a series of them, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, each of these constitutional
concerns could occupy an entire article.204 For present purposes, it is
enough to conclude that trade secrecy here treads close to significant
constitutional principles, such that, all else being equal, less trade secrecy
would be better.
1. Fourth Amendment Concerns
As an initial matter, the undisclosed use of stingray devices in
criminal investigations raises concerns under the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.205 As Kerron
Andrews’s case demonstrates, pursuant to nondisclosure agreements, law
enforcement officers have intentionally concealed their use of stingray
theory cannot . . . support the modern patent system.”). On the availability (or lack thereof) of patent
protection for software algorithms, see infra Section III.A.
202
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 112. This, too, is a subject of scholarly debate and criticism. See Price, supra
note 23, at 1781–83; Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2017–23 (2005).
203
Freeman, supra note 151, at 103.
204
Cf. Roth, supra note 20, at 2040 (“briefly” addressing the Confrontation Clause and criminal
justice algorithms, while observing that separate Article-length treatment is warranted).
205
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment does not require a state to obtain a warrant
before compelling an individual to submit to an alcohol breath test. See Birchfield v. North Dakota,
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (concluding that a warrant is not required to conduct an alcohol breath
test, which “may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving”).
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devices not only from defendants and defense counsel but also from
courts.206 Rather than disclose their intent to use a stingray device, police in
Andrews’s case sought authorization for a pen register, which imposes
different and less stringent requirements than those for a warrant.207 But as
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded, a stingray is
meaningfully different and more invasive than a pen register, and thus a
warrant was required. 208 The court expressed particular concern that police
obfuscated their true intent in seeking authorization for a pen register while
intending to deploy the more invasive stingray device.209
In that case, secrecy was not itself a constitutional violation; rather,
secrecy created circumstances in which a constitutional violation might
escape review because it is hidden from view. As the court emphasized, the
secrecy required under the Baltimore police department’s nondisclosure
agreement “prevents the court from exercising its fundamental duties under
the Constitution.”210 The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be
“reasonable” calls for balancing an individual’s right to personal security
against the public interest.211 Nondisclosure agreements, driven by
assertions of trade secrecy, “obstruct[] the court’s ability to make the
necessary constitutional appraisal” by preventing law enforcement officers
from revealing significant information about “the functionality of the
surveillance device and the range of information potentially revealed by its
use.”212
2. Due Process Concerns
Moving beyond the investigative uses of trade secret-protected
technologies, the use of such technologies to generate evidence admissible
at trial also generates tensions with the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. These constitutional provisions guarantee to
every individual the right to “due process of law.”213 The Supreme Court
has explained that this guarantee affords “criminal defendants ‘a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’”214 This right
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State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
Id. at 354, 360.
208
Id. at 327, 360.
209
Id. at 360 (“[W]e are troubled that the application for a pen register\trap & trace order did not
fully apprise the circuit court judge from whom it was sought of the information that it would yield.”).
210
Id. at 338.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
214
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,
485 (1984)).
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encompasses a defendant’s ability to impeach witnesses and evidence that
the state may introduce against him.215 Where that evidence results from the
use of stingray216 or breath test devices, or from analysis by probabilistic
genotyping software, the surest and perhaps only way to thoroughly cross
examine such evidence may be by reviewing the source code of that
criminal justice tool.217 Indeed, at least one federal judge has recognized the
essential role of adequate discovery of forensic science tools in ensuring a
fair trial.218 In a letter resigning from the National Commission on Forensic
Science, Judge Jed Rakoff explained, “if an adversary does not know in
advance sufficient information about the forensic expert and the
methodological and evidentiary bases for that expert’s opinions, the
testimony of the expert is nothing more than trial by ambush.”219
To be sure, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the “accused does
not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is . . . privileged.”220 But
the Court has also, in significant circumstances, disregarded assertions of
privilege in vindicating due process principles.221 In ordering the President
of the United States to turn over secret White House recordings, the
Supreme Court explained that allowing the President to “withhold evidence
that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial” based on the President’s
215
Cf. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (explaining that the government’s obligations
under Brady “encompass[] impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence”); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (recognizing that, under the Due Process Clause, prosecutors have a
constitutional obligation to preserve and give to a defendant material evidence pertinent to his defense).
216
Although the typical use of a stingray device implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures, see supra notes 205–212, due process principles would be
implicated if the government sought to introduce information generated by a stingray device into
evidence for its truth. For instance, if the government sought to use stingray-generated information
placing the defendant at a particular location at a particular time to establish the defendant’s location as
a matter of fact, this would implicate the defendant’s trial rights. Such use might also implicate the
Confrontation Clause, for the reasons discussed infra, notes 237–253.
217
See supra Section II.A.
218
See Jed S. Rakoff, Full Text: Judge’s Protest Resignation Letter, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/full-text-judges-protest-resignation-letter/2015/01/29/41659da6a7e1-11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/RJP5-U863].
219
Id. Judge Rakoff resigned from the Commission after he was informed that “the subject of pretrial forensic discovery—i.e., the extent to which information regarding forensic science experts and
their data, opinions, methodologies, etc., should be disclosed before they testify in court—is beyond the
‘scope’ of the Commission’s business and therefore cannot properly be the subject of Commission
reports or discussions in any respect.” Id. Shortly after this resignation, the U.S. Department of Justice
reversed that determination as to the scope of the Commission’s work, and Judge Rakoff rejoined the
Commission. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Rakoff Returns to Forensic Panel After Justice Department Backs
Off Decision, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/in-reversaldoj-lets-forensic-panel-suggest-trial-rule-changes-after-us-judge-protests/2015/01/30/2f031d9e-a89c11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html [https://perma.cc/5UC8-PG54].
220
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
221
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
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asserted need for confidentiality in presidential communications “would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the
basic function of the courts.”222 Of course, in Nixon, it was the prosecutor
who sought to compel disclosure of third-party privileged material.223 But
insofar as the Court in Nixon prioritized general due process principles over
confidentiality, its conclusion must be all the more compelling where the
specific constitutional criminal defense protections are at issue. Thus,
“when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought
for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.”224
Moreover, even if a defendant’s due process right to present a defense
is insufficient to directly vindicate a defendant’s request for source code
access, that right makes plain the harms of trade secrecy in the criminal
justice context. Absent an assertion of trade secret protection, a defendant
would likely be able to access the source code necessary to present his
defense.225 It is the assertion of trade secret protection that threatens the
defendant’s right to present a defense, regardless of whether the due
process clause would itself vindicate that right by surmounting the
assertion of trade secrecy.
The Due Process Clause also establishes minimum fairness standards
for sentencing.226 The Supreme Court has made clear that due process
guards against sentencing based on “materially false” information that a
defendant has no effective “opportunity to correct.”227 The Court has
similarly suggested that sentencing a defendant “on the basis of
confidential information which is not disclosed to the defendant or his
counsel” can run afoul of due process.228 In Gardner, a plurality opinion
concluded that due process will not abide a sentence “imposed, at least in

222

Id. at 712.
Id. at 686.
224
Id. at 713.
225
In some instances, independent bases for continued secrecy may exist. For a discussion of these
alternative bases for nondisclosure and their prospects for success, see infra notes 401–404 and
accompanying text.
226
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he sentencing process, as
well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”); see Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (invalidating a sentence because proceedings lacked due process).
227
Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741.
228
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358.
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part, on the basis of information which [the defendant] had no opportunity
to deny or explain.”229
In challenging Wisconsin’s use of COMPAS in sentencing, Eric
Loomis invoked Gardner to argue that shielding COMPAS’s formula for
weighting and calculating recidivism risk scores leads to sentences based,
at least in part, on information a defendant has no “opportunity to correct”
and “no opportunity to deny or explain.”230 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
rejected this argument, concluding that disclosure of—and opportunity to
correct, deny, or explain—the questions and answers entered into
COMPAS largely suffices.231
But this misses the point. Although Northpointe discloses the
informational input for its program, that is no guarantee that the scores that
it produces based on its proprietary weighting of that information are valid.
Due process is intended to ensure that a sentence derives from accurate
facts. If a sentence is based, even in part, on a recidivism risk score
determined by an unsound algorithm, that amounts to a sentence based on
an inaccurate fact. The inability to ascertain the validity or reliability of the
methodology underlying COMPAS’s recidivism risk scores thus runs
counter to this due process principle. As no less an authority than the
Solicitor General of the United States has conceded, “a court’s use of a risk
assessment based on an undisclosed scoring methodology creates at least
the possibility not only of scoring error, but of a flawed actuarial approach
that a defendant cannot effectively counter through other types of
evidence.”232 Indeed, the Solicitor General acknowledged that “[s]ome uses
of an undisclosed risk-assessment algorithm might raise due process
concerns.”233 For instance, were recidivism risk scores made a “part of a
sentencing ‘matrix’” or deemed to “establish a ‘presumptive’ term of
imprisonment,” this might well run afoul of the Due Process Clause.234
229
Id. at 362; see State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017). Though the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held explicitly that Gardner’s reasoning applies
beyond capital cases, see State v. Skaff, 447 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), the U.S. Supreme
Court has not, see O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 162 (1997) (confining Gardner to a case
concerned with Eighth Amendment limits in capital cases). But see id. at 173–75 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the O’Dell majority as misreading Gardner and later cases accepting Gardner’s
due process rationale).
230
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761.
231
Id. at 761.
232
U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17.
233
Id. at *18.
234
Id. The Solicitor General argued that Loomis’s case did not present such concerns because,
among other things, the sentence in that case “was not based—even in part—on undisclosed
information.” Id. at *15. That is, the Solicitor General argued that Loomis’s sentence was not based,
even in part, on the COMPAS scores appearing in his presentence report. This is a questionable reading
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Once again, it is the assertion of trade secrecy that presses on this due
process norm. As the Solicitor General observed in his brief, several states
have avoided this due process difficulty “by developing and validating
publicly available risk-assessment measures for consideration at
sentencing.”235 That is, but for the assertion of source code secrecy, this due
process concern would not arise.
3. Confrontation Concerns
Finally, the Constitution operationalizes its concern for fair trial
procedures through a panoply of Sixth Amendment criminal defense
rights.236 Of these, the Confrontation Clause has received the most attention
in this arena.237 The Confrontation Clause affords a criminal defendant the
right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”238 In a recent
article, Professor Andrea Roth argues that “machine sources sometimes
may, indeed, trigger a right of confrontation.”239 The Supreme Court has
explained, “the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”240 Roth
elaborates that a chief danger of such ex parte statements was that they
were “impressive-looking” but “unconfrontable,” leaving defendants with
“little chance of disputing them.”241 Unfortunately, “[a]llowing the state to
build or harness machines to render accusations, without also providing the
defendant a constitutional right to test the credibility of those machine
sources, resembles trial by ex parte affidavit.”242 A lab analyst or law
enforcement officer reports the results of an algorithmic process, like an
individual reading an ex parte affidavit into evidence.243 That witness
cannot speak to the underlying accuracy or reliability of the report they

of the sentencing court’s decision. As discussed above, the sentencing court specifically cited Loomis’s
COMPAS score in imposing its sentence. See Chiel, supra note 144.
235
U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17 n.5.
236
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
237
See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 118 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in criminal
cases, the defendant’s right to attack the weight of the prosecution’s evidence is of constitutional
dimension under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.”); Roth, supra note 20, at 2040–48
(“[M]achine sources sometimes may, indeed, trigger a right of confrontation.”); Wexler, supra note 10,
at 22 (“[S]cientific relevance is a floor not a ceiling to legal relevance.”). The Confrontation Clause
does not apply at sentencing. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
238
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
239
Roth, supra note 20, at 2040.
240
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
241
Roth, supra note 20, at 2041.
242
Id. at 2043.
243
Id.
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read. And yet that report, like an ex parte affidavit, is surely “impressivelooking.”244
On this view, the defendant’s right of confrontation should encompass
the opportunity to impeach the machine source itself. Cross-examining a
software developer is not a suitable substitute for examining the software
source code itself because code will never exactly embody a developer’s
intent. As discussed above, errors may arise from coding mistakes and
software rot of which the developer is unaware, 245 as well as from
predictable false positive results.246 Once again, assertions of trade secrecy
conflict with constitutional principles, here the right of the accused to
cross-examine his accusers.
The same result may flow from the Supreme Court’s recent focus on
“testimonial hearsay” as the key for the confrontation right to apply.247 In
Crawford v. Washington, the Court defined “testimony” as “[a] solemn
declaration . . . made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.”248 Pursuant to that definition, the Court has held that a defendant has
a near-sacrosanct right to cross examine the particular forensic analyst who
certifies the results of a laboratory process.249 More generally, statements
are testimonial where they are made in response to police interrogation,
where “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”250
The results produced by criminal justice algorithms fall comfortably
within the scope of this understanding of “testimonial.” Such results are
“solemn” and produced “for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.”251 As they arise from law enforcement requests or direct use of
criminal justice technologies, it makes sense to think of these results as the
product of a kind of “police interrogation,” the primary purpose of which is

244

Id. at 2041.
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text; see also Chessman, supra note 16, at 186–92
(identifying “structural sources of error” that may unintentionally cause software to be unreliable or
faulty, including “accidental errors,” “software updates to legacy code,” and “software rot”).
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See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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For recent cases focusing on the scope of “testimonial hearsay” for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, see Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
564 U.S. 647 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
249
See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11. The Confrontation
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Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
251
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to inform a criminal investigation and possible prosecution.252 As Roth
explains, “[i]f the point of targeting solemnity is to capture what is
particularly abusive about the state purposely relying on impressive but
unconfronted allegations of crime as a substitute for testimony, then
machine sources would seem to be squarely implicated.”253 The result is
that source code should be disclosed for purposes of cross-examination and
impeachment. When assertions of trade secrecy prevent such disclosure,
those assertions once again impose constitutional risks, if not outright
harms.
*

*

*

Assertions of trade secrecy interfere with defendants’ abilities to
vindicate their due process and confrontation rights at trial and their due
process interests at sentencing; they also hamstring defendants and courts
alike in their efforts to ensure that the government does not engage in
unreasonable searches. Regardless of whether these trade-secret-related
difficulties rise to the level of independent constitutional violations, they
make plain that trade secret assertion in the criminal justice context exists
in tension with bedrock constitutional principles.
III. THE MANY TOOLS OF INNOVATION POLICY
In light of established and potential harms of criminal justice
secrecy—both practical and constitutional—less trade secrecy and less
deference to asserted trade secret status would be an improvement. Yet
courts have largely declined to examine vigorously the assertions of trade
secret protection in these criminal contexts.254 Moreover, in rejecting
requests for source code access, courts have often deferred to private
developers’ assertions of dire competitive harm should their asserted trade
secret be revealed. 255 Law enforcement entities have worked hand in glove
with private developers to shield criminal justice technologies from outside
scrutiny.256 Some scholars have likewise adopted ominous predictions in
252

See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
Roth, supra note 20, at 2048.
254
See Wexler, supra note 10, at 40–42 (describing likely instances of over-claiming and abuse in
private assertions of trade secret protection in the criminal justice context).
255
See, e.g., Memorandum Order at 2, Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Feb. 4, 2016) (refusing to order disclosure of TrueAllele’s source code because it “would
cause irreparable harm to the company, as other companies would be able to copy the code and
potentially put him out of business”).
256
See, e.g., supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text (discussing FBI collaboration with Harris
to assure stingray secrecy); see supra notes 74–76, 80 and accompanying text (discussing state
253
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support of trade secrecy. As one author explains, “[i]f the information is
publicly circulated and copied, the company can lose licensing revenue. If
the software in question is one of the company’s most valuable assets, the
result might be the bankruptcy of the company.”257
Among other things, these responses reflect concern that, absent trade
secret protection, developers will be unable to continue and improve upon
their work. Concern that judicial action may inhibit innovation is laudable.
After all, well-designed criminal justice algorithms promise a more fair and
more just criminal justice system. As set forth above, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology described probabilistic
genotyping as a significant and welcome advance in the science.258
Similarly, draft revisions to the Model Penal Code explain that “welldesigned actuarial risk-assessment tools offer better predictions of future
behavior than the clinical judgments of treatment professionals such as
psychiatrists and psychologists, or the intuitions of criminal-justice
professionals such as judges and probation officers.”259
Concern that judicial action may inhibit innovation is also common
when courts encounter advanced technology. For instance, similar concerns
pervaded Moore v. Regents of the University of California, in which the
California Supreme Court famously denied that an individual has any
property right in cells removed from his body that are used in scientific
research.260 In reaching that holding, the court opined that recognizing a
property right in one’s cells would have a chilling effect on socially
beneficial medical research. 261
Yet, such concern is misplaced when it comes to mediating the
relationship between private developers of criminal justice algorithms and
the criminal defendants (and sometimes courts) who wish to examine their
source code.262 Focusing on the potential costs of breaching trade secret
protection in fact answers the wrong question. Trade secrecy is but one tool
avoidance of source code possession for alcohol breath test devices); see also infra notes 399–401 and
accompanying text (acknowledging and discussing alternative bases for continued source code
nondisclosure, apart from trade secrecy).
257
Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 125 (citations omitted).
258
PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 79 (“These probabilistic genotyping software programs
clearly represent a major improvement over purely subjective interpretation.”).
259
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 3 2014).
260
793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990).
261
Id. at 493 (emphasizing the need not to threaten “innocent parties who are engaged in socially
useful activities” with “disabling civil liability”).
262
Existing scholarship, where it tackles trade secrecy in this field at all, treats such secrecy as
inevitable. Such scholarship accordingly argues for disclosure-forcing mechanisms within the confines
of existing trade secret and evidence law. See Wexler, supra note 10. This is an important project, but it
is narrower than the one to which this Article is addressed.
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of many that the government may deploy to spur innovation. Moreover,
those tools may be uniquely within the government’s reach in the field of
criminal justice algorithms because government entities are the primary (or
sole) purchasers of such technologies.263
This Part identifies the array of policy mechanisms available for
incentivizing innovation in the field of criminal justice algorithms. The
literature on innovation policy is vast,264 and so this Part aims to synthesize
that literature to identify how these innovation levers differ and which may
best be applied to spur the development of criminal justice algorithms.
Some of these levers more easily advance the goal of device and source
code disclosure. Some are more easily implemented than others in the
criminal justice context. Some are already in use. Thus, a court’s decision
to require disclosure sufficient to enable vigorous inspection, testing, and
validation need not leave innovators without sufficient rewards for their
work.
A. Patents and Trade Secrets
Patents are the traditional foil to trade secrecy. 265 Together, patents and
trade secrecy function as mechanisms of innovation policy that award what
amounts to a property right to inventors.266 But each form of intellectual
property offers a different scope of protection and different burdens.
Only a brief overview of trade secret law is needed to situate
alternative innovation policy mechanisms by comparison. Trade secret
protection springs largely from state law, though the basic contours of the
doctrine are fairly consistent across jurisdictions.267 As set forth above, a
263

See infra Section IV.A.
E.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1530–34 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (comparing
patents, prizes, and grants); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 317–26 (summarizing the literature on
patents versus prizes versus grants and adding tax incentives to the range of innovation policy levers);
see also Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–21 (2003)
(describing a prize alternative to patents); Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST.
L.J. 299, 308–09 (2015) (identifying regulatory competitive shelters as an additional tool for spurring
innovation in highly regulated fields).
265
See, e.g., Price, supra note 23, at 1769 (“Inventors face a stark choice between two intellectual
property systems of protecting innovative ideas: patents and trade secrecy.”); Derek Handova, The
Business of IP: Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets, IP WATCHDOG (May 25, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/25/choosing-patents-and-trade-secrets/id=69368
[https://perma.cc/L25Q-WFQ2] (“Patents and trade secrets represent two of the most common methods
to protect IP. However, the most astute lawyers know when to favor one over the other.”).
266
See Price, supra note 23, at 1775–76.
267
Id. at 1776 n.30. Federal law also provides some trade secret protection through the Economic
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012), and the recently enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
264
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trade secret is information that is “subject to reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy and derives independent economic value from its secrecy.”268 Trade
secret protection depends on continued secrecy; public disclosure is
anathema to it.269 Indeed, absent public disclosure, a trade secret may
persist indefinitely. The scope of trade secret protection, however, is quite
narrow. Trade secret law protects secret information only from its
misappropriation.270 Legal liability attaches where a person “uses or
discloses trade secret information in violation of a duty of confidence or
after acquiring the information by theft or fraud.”271 But trade secret law
gives no relief where others reverse engineer an innovation or
independently invent it.272 As the preceding discussion has made evident,
trade secret holders routinely assert a privilege against disclosure in
litigation to bar or limit discovery of its protected information.
Patent law, by contrast, is a creature exclusively of federal law. An
invention is patentable only if it comprises patentable subject matter and is
new, useful, and nonobvious.273 Moreover, and most significantly for
present purposes, patent law requires public disclosure of an invention as a
condition for obtaining a patent.274 Indeed, “[t]he traditional quid pro quo
view of the patent system imagines the patent grant as the carrot used to
entice inventors to reveal their valuable secrets to the public.”275 Disclosure
is satisfied by “a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it,” sufficient to enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to make and use it as well.276 This disclosure must
accompany an application for a patent, and such applications typically are
published eighteen months after the filing date.277 A successful patentee
gains broad exclusive rights to his invention, including the right to make,
use, or sell that invention in the United States.278 Unlike a trade secret,
268

Price, supra note 23, at 1776.
Id. at 1777.
270
Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 244 (1998) (emphasizing trade secret law’s basis in relational
duties).
271
Bone, supra note 270, at 244.
272
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmts. 1–2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1985).
273
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012).
274
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (listing what the inventor must include in the public disclosure).
275
J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 919 (2011). Scholars
debate whether patent law’s disclosure requirements actually facilitate meaningful disclosure. See supra
note 201. That debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
276
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
277
35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 122(b) (2012).
278
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (covering patent infringement and the inventor’s remedies for
enforcing exclusivity rights).
269
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reverse engineering or independent invention of a patented innovation
nonetheless constitutes infringement.279 Further, patent protection is timelimited. Under current law, patent rights expire twenty years after the date
of the patent application.280
In recent years, the Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention
to the scope of patentable subject matter.281 The Court has long held that the
patentable subject matter provision “contains an important implicit
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.”282 Within the last decade, however, the Court has enforced this
exception with renewed vigor, holding that methods for hedging risk,283
calibrating drug dosing,284 and mitigating settlement risk each amounted to
an invalid effort to patent an abstract idea.285 The Supreme Court also held
that patents on isolated DNA sequences are invalid because such sequences
are a “product of nature.”286
Under this line of cases, many criminal justice algorithms might well
be nonpatentable subject matter. The Court has held that mathematical
processes are abstract ideas ineligible for patent protection, at least insofar
as those ideas are not inventively applied some real-world application.287
Consequently, because computer algorithms are mathematical processes,
they often cannot be protected with patents. The addition of a physical
computer on which such an algorithm can run, the Court has emphasized, is
not enough to render it patentable.288 Rather, to be patent-eligible, an
invention directed at an abstract idea—such as an algorithm—must include
an “inventive concept” that “ensure[s] that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”289 Criminal
justice algorithms like TrueAllele and COMPAS, which are simply
279
See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
37 (2017) (“The patent grant is nearly absolute, barring even those who independently develop the
invention from practicing its art.”).
280
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
281
See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
282
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 589 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
283
Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
284
Mayo, 566 U.S. 66.
285
Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
286
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 580.
287
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
288
Id. at 2358 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
289
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73; see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
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sophisticated software programs, may be particularly susceptible to
exclusion from patentability.290
In light of the difficulty of patenting criminal justice algorithms and
the traditional dichotomy of patents and trade secrets, it is unsurprising that
many private developers of these algorithms have pursued trade secret
protection. As set out above, however, the harms flowing from this choice
are significant.291 Fortunately, patents and trade secrets are not the only
tools available for incentivizing innovation.
B. Prizes
Prizes as a tool to spur innovation have a distinguished pedigree. In
1714, the British government offered a prize of £20,000 (worth more than
£1 million today) to the inventor of a method for determining longitude at
sea.292 More recently, prizes have won renewed interest. In 2014, the British
government reconvened the Longitude Committee to facilitate a modern
prize process.293 In the United States, the National Academy of Engineering
recommended that the federal government invest more extensively in
certain prize competitions.294 In 2009, the President urged agencies to
increase their use of prizes as incentives for innovation, and to date, federal
agencies have offered more than $250 million in more than 803 “challenge
and prize competitions.”295 These competitions include prizes for
“develop[ing] algorithms that advance place-based crime forecasting,”296
290
Cybergenetics, which created and sells TrueAllele, lists several TrueAllele patents on its
website.
Patents,
CYBERGENETICS,
https://www.cybgen.com/information/patents.shtml
[https://perma.cc/FG5L-Q9CB]. All of these patents claim methods or systems related to genetic
analysis. See id. All but two, however, were issued well before the Supreme Court’s renewed focus on
patentable subject matter. See id.; U.S. Patent No. 8,898,021 (filed Feb. 2, 2001) (issued Nov. 25,
2014); U.S. Patent No. 9,708,642 (filed Nov. 20, 2014) (issued July 18, 2017). Sophisticated criminal
justice algorithms may also face patenting difficulties for written description and enablement reasons.
See W. Nicholson Price II, Describing Black-Box Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 347, 348, 351–
52 (2015) (concluding that satisfying the written description and enablement requirements is difficult,
but not insurmountable, for “black-box” medicine, and defining “black-box” medicine as medically
related algorithms that are opaque because they are so complex as to be “practically nontransparent” or
because they are the product of machine learning).
291
See supra Part II.
292
See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 32 (2004); Martin Rees, A Longitude
Prize for the Twenty-First Century, 509 NATURE 401, 401 (2014).
293
Rees, supra note 292.
294
NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT PRIZES IN
ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE 1 (1999).
295
About, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/about [https://perma.cc/6PW2-26R5];
Challenges, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/list [https://perma.cc/JFS5-NTLT] (“803
Competitions Found”).
296
Real-Time Crime Forecasting Challenge, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/
challenge/real-time-crime-forecasting-challenge [http://perma.cc/T4JW-S8M7].
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determining “the amount and rate of change of the ballistic performance
of” individual body armor vests,297 and designing “new automated detection
algorithms . . . that improve the speed, accuracy, and detection of small
threat objects and other prohibited items during the airport passenger
screening process.”298
The prizes best suited for encouraging innovation are inducement
prizes—those “designed to foster progress toward or achievement of a
specific objective by offering a named prize or award.”299 Inducement
prizes typically reward those “who provide the best entry in a contest or
who first meet some specified technical goal.”300 Governments are not the
only entities capable of establishing and awarding prizes. Some of the bestknown modern prizes spring from private sources, including the famed
Ansari XPRIZE, which offered $10 million for a privately financed,
reusable spacecraft “capable of carrying three people to 100 kilometers
above the Earth’s surface twice within two weeks.”301
Unlike patents, which demand public disclosure, or trade secrets,
which shun public disclosure, prizes are agnostic on the matter of
disclosure.302 Prizes can condition their rewards on disclosure of the
winning or participating entrants, though many existing prizes have
declined to impose such conditions.303 Although prizes typically exist
alongside traditional intellectual property regimes, some scholars have
proposed utilizing prizes in place of such regimes.304 These proposals
largely rely on government-managed prizes.305
In assessing the comparative virtues and vices of patents and prizes,
some key differences appear. First, patents differ from many other

297
National Institute of Justice Body Armor Challenge: How Long Does Body Armor Really Last?,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/funding/Pages/fy12-body-armor-challenge.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XMY8-BLDB].
298
Passenger Screening Algorithm Challenge, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/
challenge/passenger-screening-algorithm-challenge [https://perma.cc/2WF9-RXTJ].
299
NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, supra note 294, at 1. Prizes can also be awarded in recognition of past
achievements. See id. at A-1 (contrasting recognition and inducement prizes).
300
Id.
301
Ansari XPRIZE®, XPRIZE FOUND., http://ansari.xprize.org [https://perma.cc/KD99-YXLD].
The prize was awarded in 2004. Id.
302
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 355–56.
303
See id. at 356 & n. 231 (citing GOOGLE LUNAR X PRIZE, MASTER TEAM AGREEMENT,
VERSION 1.0 §§ 11.1-11.5 (Nov. 24, 2009), https://ia801304.us.archive.org/20/items/wikileaksarchive/googlelunarx-prize-final-master-team-agreement-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TQB-4EN9]).
304
See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–21 (2003)
(surveying the literature).
305
See id. at 121 (“Prize system advocates recognize that the devil is in the details and that the
devil for a prize system is the government’s ability to dispense rewards accurately.”).
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innovation mechanisms, including prizes, in “who decides which projects
to reward and how much to reward them.”306 Under the patent system, once
a patent issues, market forces of supply and demand determine whether and
how much an innovation is worth through consumer purchases (or lack
thereof) at supracompetitive prices.307 The same is true for trade secrets. So
long as trade secrecy is intact, market forces determine what
supracompetitive price is acceptable.308 By contrast, prize administrators
typically fix the amount of a prize when the prize is announced, rather than
when it is awarded, and they bear responsibility for determining when a
submission has succeeded.309 These differences require a prize giver to
accurately forecast the value of a potential innovation, as well as the
difficulties it might face in reaching fruition.310 Prizes accordingly give the
government, rather than the market, power to determine the amount of the
economic reward for innovation.
Second, prizes typically diverge from traditional intellectual property
doctrines on the matter of who pays the supracompetitive reward for
innovation. When the government administers a prize, its funds are often
drawn from general tax revenue.311 Conversely, trade secrets and patents
extract supracompetitive revenue only from their own consumers.312 They
thus eschew enlisting the general public in paying for a particular
innovation and place the burden on the purchasers of IP-protected
products.313
Yet these policy differences may not be so significant in the context of
criminal justice tools. Both of the major policy divides between prizes, on
the one hand, and patents and trade secrets, on the other, turn on the greater
role the government typically plays in administering prizes. But in the
criminal justice context, government entities also dominate the role of “the
market” that is central to patent and trade secret policy. Tools like
stingrays, alcohol breath test devices, probabilistic genotyping software
306

See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327.
Id. at 327.
308
Id. at 346–47 (“Trade secret protection, like patent protection, is an ex post, market-set
transfer . . . .”).
309
Id. at 327.
310
Id. Prizes need not always suffer the full force of these forecasting difficulties; some prizes
scale rewards with market performance. See Tania Cernuschi et al., Advance Market Commitment for
Pneumococcal Vaccines: Putting Theory into Practice, 89 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 913 (2011)
(describing the Advance Market Commitment (AMC) program for pneumococcal vaccines, which
guarantees a minimum price per vaccine dose sold); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 318–19.
311
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 346.
312
Id. at 347; see also id. (“Patents and trade secrets come closest to satisfying the user-pays
principle.”).
313
Id. at 346–47.
307
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programs, and recidivism risk statistic packages are largely, if not
exclusively, purchased by government entities, usually law enforcement.314
It might even be unlawful for a nongovernment actor to procure such
devices.315
Prizes might be operationalized in the criminal justice sphere in at
least two ways. First, discrete technological tools the government is
interested in developing and using might be the subject of a one-time
inducement prize. As set forth above, at least one such prize has already
been offered. The federal government’s Office of Justice Programs issued a
challenge prize to “develop algorithms that advance place-based crime
forecasting.”316 Second, law enforcement or judicial procurement offices
may already functionally be paying prize-like bounties for the criminal
justice tools they acquire by paying supracompetitive prices.317 In
particular, exclusive government procurement contracts netting
supracompetitive profits are quite a significant prize to capture.318
C. Grants
Government grants are disbursements of funds that provide direct
financial support to undertake or complete a project.319 In 2015, total
federal research and development (R&D) spending exceeded $130
billion.320 More than half of these funds supported defense-related R&D,321

314

See infra Section IV.A.
See, e.g., Harris Letter, supra note 13, at 1 (proposing, as a condition of FTC approval for
Harris’s sale of stingray devices, that “[t]he marketing and sale of these devices shall be limited to
federal/state/local public safety and law enforcement officers only”).
316
Real-Time Crime Forecasting Challenge, CHALLENGE.GOV, https://www.challenge.gov/
challenge/real-time-crime-forecasting-challenge [http://perma.cc/T4JW-S8M7].
317
Hemel and Ouellette categorize “procurement contracts” as a form of government grant. Hemel
& Ouellette, supra note 19, at 320–21 n.73. As discussed below, however, grants are typically defined
by their infusion of government funds to support research and development, rather than to purchase
completed inventions. See infra text accompanying note 329. Law enforcement or other procurement of
tools deployed to investigate, prosecute, or sentence criminals is closer to an ex post prize than an ex
ante grant.
318
See also infra notes 351–353 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive contracts in the
context of regulatory exclusivities).
319
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 320 & n.73. Grants can encompass both funds awarded to
nongovernment researchers and direct spending in government research laboratories, id. at 320, though
the former is of primary interest here.
320
Michael Yamaner, Total Federal Research and Development Funding Down 1% in FY 2015,
but Funding for Research Up 1%, INFOBRIEF at 1 (Mar. 2017), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/
nsf17316/nsf17316.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HAJ-VADT].
321
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 217 tbl.9.7 (2016) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-TAB/pdf/BUDGET2016-TAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SMJ-EHAM].
315
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a common birthplace for criminal justice algorithms and other tools.322
Moreover, state governments also invest significantly in research grants,
though much of that money is allocated to university research.323
Grant funding may, but need not, be conditioned on disclosure of the
fruits of that funding. In general, grant recipients are required to disclose to
the federal government any patentable inventions arising from grant-funded
research.324 Grant recipients typically are not required to disclose nonpatentable discoveries—and encouraging such disclosure can be
challenging.325 This is not to say that more rigorous disclosure requirements
would be inconsistent with the regulatory framework of grant funding.
Rather, in the context of criminal justice technologies, grant-making
agencies might well conclude that a more robust disclosure requirement is
appropriate. For instance, just as the federal government requires
communication of patentable inventions “within a reasonable time after
[such invention] becomes known,” the government might require
disclosure of grant-supported trade secret information “within a reasonable
time after” such information is developed.326
Like prizes, grants allocate to the government both determination of
the amount of the innovation incentive and the obligation to pay for it,
usually from general funds.327 But grants differ from prizes, as well as trade
secrets and patents, because grant funding infuses capital to potential
innovators before a completed or commercial product is available, rather
than rewarding successful inventors ex post.328 This earlier distribution of

322
See, e.g., Jemal R. Brinson, Cell Site Simulators: How Law Enforcement Can Track You, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/plus/ct-cellphone-tracking-devices20160129-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/R2KY-Q4RW] (“[Stingray technology] was initially
developed and used by military and intelligence agencies and over time made its way to state and local
law enforcement agencies.”).
323
See RONDA BRITT, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATS., UNIVERSITIES REPORT HIGHESTEVER R&D SPENDING OF $65 BILLION IN FY 2011, at 2 (2012), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/
nsf13305/nsf13305.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q93V-2TG5]; CHRISTOPHER PECE, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. &
ENG’G STATS., STATE GOVERNMENT R&D EXPENDITURES TOTAL MORE THAN $2.2 BILLION IN FY
2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsf17307/nsf17307.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8D5MGAG] (“State government agency expenditures for research and development totaled $2.2 billion in
[fiscal year] 2015, an increase of 16.9% from FY 2014”). (Noting that, from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal
year 2011, “[i]nstitution-funded R&D rose by over $500 million to $12.4 billion”).
324
35 U.S.C. §§ 201(d)–(e), 202(c)(1) (2012).
325
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 356, 356 n.226 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1674–75 (1996)).
326
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1).
327
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327, 345.
328
See id. at 333, 348.
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funds may enable more and smaller companies to enter the market, as it
reduces the private capital investments required for innovation.329
Grants appear already to be in use to support the development of some
criminal justice technologies. Mark Perlin, the creator of TrueAllele, was
the successful recipient of several federal government research grants.
Between 1997 and 2000, Cybergenetics, Perlin’s company, received four
grants under the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.330
At least two of these grants appear directly related to the development of
TrueAllele.331 Each grant was administered by the Department of Health
and Human Services.332
On the whole, however, direct grant funding is likely to be less well
suited than other innovation policy mechanisms for encouraging innovation
in criminal justice technologies, particularly for development by private
companies like the ones now asserting trade secret protection. For one
thing, grant funding for private sector R&D is simply less common than
similar funding for R&D at universities or within government itself.333 For
another, grants in this context may be particularly subject to the
inefficiencies believed to accompany government-set rewards.334 In
particular, scholars have frequently critiqued grants as a tool of innovation
policy because grant-funding decisions are believed to rely on “decisionmaking by centralized government bureaucrats who often lack market
actors’ superior knowledge.”335 On this view, grants require the government
to accurately identify which potential innovations to pursue, determine who
is most likely to produce viable results, and calculate the value of those
innovations and the cost of development.336
329

Id. at 336–39; see also About SBIR, SBIR-STTR: AMERICA’S SEED FUND,
https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir [https://perma.cc/4N8K-C3C4] (discussing the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program, which “funds the critical startup and development stages” of
technological innovation at small businesses through “a competitive awards-based program”).
330
Cybergenetics Corporation, SBIR-STTR: AMERICA’S SEED FUND, https://www.sbir.gov/
sbirsearch/detail/139893 [https://perma.cc/S785-MFGX].
331
Id. (reciting two grants for “automated microsatellite genotyping”).
332
Id.
333
University R&D investments, for instance, significantly outpace other state R&D expenditures.
Compare PECE, supra note 323, at 1 (reciting $2.2 billion in R&D expenditures flowing from state
government agencies in fiscal year 2015), with BRITT, supra note 323, at 2 (reciting institution-funded
R&D exceeding $12 billion in fiscal year 2011); see also About SBIR, supra note 329 (explaining that
federal agencies with large R&D budgets must allocate 3.2% of those funds to the SBIR program).
334
See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants 11–18 (Dec. 5, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (summarizing the three primary critiques of grants as a tool of innovation policy: bureaucratic
decision-making, unaccountable ex ante incentives, and problematic risk allocation between funder and
grantee).
335
Id. at 13; see id. at 13–14.
336
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327.
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In practice, this critique is somewhat misplaced, at least for many
traditionally grant-funded fields. For instance, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), the largest nondefense grant funder of research, often enlists
outside experts to assist the agency in determining both what areas of
innovation to fund and which specific projects to fund.337 In so doing, the
NIH can capture, at least in part, the “special advantage” associated with
harnessing private information in directing innovation.338 But this
internalization of outside expertise is likely to be more difficult where
innovating criminal justice algorithms is at issue. In this field, available
outside experts are more likely to be for-profit competitors (or other
government entities), rather than academic colleagues. This is likely to
heighten the risk of conflicts of interest and make even-handed grant
evaluation difficult to achieve.
D. Regulatory Exclusivities
Regulatory exclusivities are “competitive advantages resulting from
statutory bars on regulatory action where such action is otherwise
mandated and would have taken place but for the triggering of the bar.”339
Such exclusivity arises where a government entity is barred from taking
some action that would introduce or enhance competition in a product or
market.340 Government nonaction effectively “shelters” from competition
the beneficiary of earlier government action, granting that beneficiary a
competitive advantage, if not a de facto monopoly, in the relevant
market.341 Regulatory exclusivities arise most frequently under the auspices
of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).342 For instance, under the
Orphan Drug Act, once the FDA approves a drug product to treat a
particular “rare disease or condition” (an “orphan condition”),343 it is barred
from approving another drug for that condition for a period of seven
years.344
337
See Price, supra note 334, at 24–25 (discussing the role of outside experts in soliciting
research—deciding what areas of innovation to fund); id. at 26–28 (discussing the role of outside
experts in peer review of grant applications—deciding what specific projects and innovators to fund).
338
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 327–28 (quoting Brian D. Wright, The Economics of
Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 703 (1983)).
339
Heled, supra note 264, at 305.
340
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id. at 353–54.
343
See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012) (defining “rare disease or condition”). Well-known
examples of orphan (that is, rare) diseases include Huntington’s disease and amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS/Lou Gehrig’s disease). Heled, supra note 264, at 336 n.145.
344
21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2012); see also Heled, supra note 264, at 302 (discussing the Orphan
Drug Act).
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As operationalized in the Orphan Drug Act and similar programs,
regulatory exclusivities operate as patent-like rewards for innovation.345
These exclusivities reward completed innovation, with supracompetitive
prices determined by what amounts to a market monopoly and paid by
product purchasers, rather than the broader public.346 Unlike patents,
however, regulatory exclusivities do not, by definition, require public
disclosures of any kind. The government may impose disclosure demands
as a condition of exclusivity, of course, because the government sets the
terms for the creation and awarding of these exclusive rights.347
Insofar as patent-like protection would be desirable for criminal
justice algorithms but is unavailable due to difficulties qualifying as
patentable subject matter,348 regulatory exclusivities may offer a way
forward. To be sure, during a period of exclusivity, innovation directed at a
particular way of solving a particular problem may be slowed. But that is a
consequence of exclusive rights, whether they arise from patent law, FDA
regulations, or procurement policy. Moreover, robust exclusive rights often
pair well with robust disclosure requirements, as in patent law,349
suggesting that regulatory exclusivities in this context may be particularly
generative.
Indeed, such exclusivities may already effectively be in place for
some technologies. For many criminal justice technologies, government
entities enter into exclusive contracts with a single private company to
obtain a particular kind of technology. For instance, Mark Perlin,
TrueAllele’s creator, objected when he learned that the FBI proposed to
enter into a “sole source contract” to obtain STRmix for probabilistic
genotyping.350 Northpointe, meanwhile, holds an exclusive contract to

345
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 345, 359 (2007) (describing FDA exclusivities in the context of pharmaceutical
technologies as “pseudo-patents”); Heled, supra note 264, at 300 (noting that this mechanism for
encouraging and rewarding innovation has been described not only as a “regulatory exclusivit[y]” but
also as a “pseudo-patent exclusivit[y]”);
346
See supra text accompanying notes 307–308, 312, 328.
347
Requiring or enforcing disclosure may be more difficult in view of the fact that different
government components are typically responsible for creating and administering regulatory
exclusivities. These exclusivities arise from statute, but they are typically administered by agencies
(principally the FDA). See Heled, supra note 264, at 305. If the statutory scheme fails to specify a
disclosure obligation, the agency may be constrained from imposing one itself. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(2012).
348
See supra Section III.A.
349
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 279, at 245 (“A patent can be a potent property right. In
exchange for this grant from the government, an inventor must disclose the workings of his or her
invention in enough detail to be informative to other people working in the same field.”).
350
Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 1.
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provide the State of Wisconsin with recidivism risk statistics.351 These
exclusive arrangements might well function like regulatory exclusivities,
particularly if they carry a minimum term of exclusivity.
E. Tax Incentives
The government invests in innovation not only by spending its money
on grants and prizes but also by granting favorable tax treatment to certain
R&D activities.352 The two largest existing R&D tax expenditures allow
taxpayers to expense research and experimental spending and to claim a tax
credit for certain increases in a taxpayer’s research spending.353 Most states
also give favorable tax treatment to R&D expenditures.354 A majority of
these states pattern their R&D tax incentives on their federal counterpart.355
Nine states, however, employ partially or fully refundable tax credits,
which permit a company to claim the credit even if it has too little income
against which to offset that credit.356
All of these policies provide tax relief tied to expenditures for research
itself, rather than the results of that research. Accordingly, these tax
incentives, like grants, reward potential innovators ex ante by permitting
more capital to stay with innovators.357 Like grants, these tax incentives
may encourage not only more innovation but also innovation by more
participants.358 Like patents, trade secrets, and regulatory exclusivities,
however, tax incentives permit the market to dictate the measure of

351

Freeman, supra note 151, at 92.
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 113–32, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 83–105 (comm. print 2014) (summarizing the
principle provisions); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 321–26 (same).
353
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 352, at 83–105.
354
See LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, MEMORANDUM: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT TAX INCENTIVES 5 (2013), http://bit.ly/2tKOpYB [https://perma.cc/KT82-AFXE]
(“Forty-three states offer some type of R&D specific tax incentive with 16 states offering a business tax
incentive, 3 states offering a sales tax incentive, and 24 states offering both.”).
355
Id. at 6 (“A majority of states (31) use the federal definition of [qualified research expenses]
from the Internal Revenue Code, Section 41, with a modification to include only expenses incurred
within the state.”).
356
Id.
357
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 331–32.
358
As Hemel and Ouellette observe, the existing federal R&D tax incentives, and the majority of
existing state R&D tax incentives, favor well-established corporations because their benefits can be
realized only if a taxpayer has income to offset. Id. at 337. But the skew towards established companies
is not an inherent feature of tax incentives for research. See id. Indeed, nine states have enacted
refundable R&D tax credits, which allow a taxpayer to collect the credit regardless of whether the
business reports taxable income. Id.
352
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financial reward: up to a point, the more an innovator invests in research,
the greater the tax break.359
Unfortunately, existing tax incentives for R&D facilitate developer
secrecy much more than disclosure. Taxpayers who claim an R&D tax
benefit must maintain records establishing their entitlement to that
benefit,360 but that hardly constitutes meaningful access for anyone other
than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Tax return information is
confidential,361 and so the IRS is severely restricted in its ability to disclose
supporting paperwork.362 Yet, the contours of existing tax incentives do not
foreclose disclosure-facilitating amendments or alternatives. Secrecy is not
inherent in tax incentive policy the way it is in trade secret law. To the
contrary, tax credits might well be conditioned on certain public
disclosures.363 As long as the value of the tax credit exceeds any losses due
to increased competition stemming from disclosure, a rational developer
should choose disclosure.
More troubling for the use of tax policy to encourage innovation is the
fact that, though R&D tax credits are widespread, they are largely
motivated by concerns other than encouraging innovation.364 Indeed, the
most common motivation is economic development—new jobs—rather
than innovation—new knowledge.365 Insofar as incentivizing innovation is
merely a beneficial secondary effect of tax policy, that policy is unlikely to
reflect best practices for innovation, like public disclosure, that are
orthogonal to a policy’s true goal.
*

*

*

A multitude of policy mechanisms are available for incentivizing
innovation, including in developing criminal justice technology. Trade
secrecy is merely one innovation policy lever among many. Some of these
levers, like trade secret protection, increase the likelihood and scope of
nondisclosure and other forms of secrecy. Others, including patents, prizes,
grants, regulatory exclusivities, and tax incentives coupled with appropriate
359

Id. at 328, 333.
See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.41-4(d) (2016) (recordkeeping requirements for claiming the tax credit
for increasing research activities).
361
See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2016) (confidentiality of tax return information).
362
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 356.
363
Id. (“[T]ax credit[s] should be conditioned on public disclosure to the extent that such
disclosure does not significantly undermine the innovation incentive.”).
364
See Chad R. Miller & Brian Richard, The Policy Diffusion of the State R&D Investment Tax
Credit, 42 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 22 (2010).
365
Id. at 24.
360
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disclosure requirements, decrease that likelihood. Together, this panoply of
policy tools makes plain that alternative mechanisms exist for spurring
helpful innovation in the criminal justice field without sacrificing the
practical and constitutional necessities of access to source code.
IV. INNOVATING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Innovation policy is more than simply intellectual property rights like
trade secrets and patents. As discussed above, mechanisms for encouraging
innovation can fund companies doing research or reward companies for the
successful products of that research. Most of these mechanisms can be
coupled with a requirement to disclose source code or other relevant
information beyond the confines of a protective order or nondisclosure
agreement. This Part accordingly articulates how courts and policymakers
can best encourage or enforce optimal source code disclosure. It first
explains that implementing alternative innovation policy mechanisms may
be particularly efficient and effective in the context of criminal justice
algorithms because government entities are the primary (or sole) purchasers
of such technologies. In view of the range of alternative innovation policies
on which the government can draw, secrecy is not necessary for adequate
innovation. Indeed, many of the tools of innovation policy are already a
part of funding the development and purchase of criminal justice
technology.
Turning to the mechanics of an appropriate disclosure requirement,
this Part next argues that, to alleviate the practical and potentially
constitutional harms of source code secrecy, optimal source code disclosure
should be both broad and early. Broad disclosure means disclosure that
reaches beyond the parties in a particular criminal prosecution and may
include public disclosure. Early disclosure means disclosure that precedes a
technology’s use in a particular criminal investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing. Acknowledging that government policymakers are best suited
to require broad and early disclosure, this Part nonetheless contends that
courts need not wait for these regulators to act before ordering source code
disclosure in individual cases. If courts order disclosure, policymakers may
follow that lead, implementing complementary innovation incentives as
needed along the way. Indeed, recent experience supports a court-initiated
movement toward transparency.
A. Efficient Alternative Innovation Policies
The government, as both a funder of research and the primary
purchaser of criminal justice technologies, is uniquely well positioned to
implement alternative innovation policies in an efficient and effective
714
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manner. Innovation policy typically must make choices about whether to
put pricing power and payment obligations in government hands or users’
hands. But for criminal justice algorithms and related tools, these amount to
much the same thing. Government entities enjoy a monopsony (or at least
an oligopsony) for many criminal justice algorithms.366 That is, government
entities are the only (or near only) purchasers of these technologies.367
Some separation between innovation payor and product purchaser
may arise where the government entity that purchases technology is not the
same entity as the one that awarded the developer a prize, grant, or tax
credit. For instance, the City of Baltimore will bear the costs of innovation
differently depending on whether the federal government pursues
innovation policy principally through patents (in which Baltimore will pay
supracompetitive prices for a product) or prizes (in which the federal
government will shoulder some of the premium for innovation, yielding
potentially lower prices to product purchasers).
But the relatively limited number of possible purchasers for criminal
justice algorithms—law enforcement, departments of corrections, and
judicial officers—creates less disjunction between payor and purchaser
than typically exists. Moreover, when a single government entity (whether
local, state, or federal) contemplates what innovation policy to adopt to
facilitate its own acquisition of new tools, it will be both payor and
purchaser regardless of whether it awards grants or tax credits. This
multiplies the range of innovation policy levers the government may
efficiently utilize to calibrate the financial rewards for accurate, reliable,
and transparent criminal justice tools.
Moreover, many innovation policy mechanisms are already in place,
awaiting the addition of a proper disclosure requirement. As suggested
earlier, government procurement of criminal justice tools resemble—or
could be made to resemble—prizes or regulatory exclusivities.368
Government procurement policy can act as both purchase and prize where
the government is the only authorized buyer. If a government entity exerts
its monopsony power to extract unusually low prices, it is likely to underinduce innovation and development in the field. By contrast, if the
government pays supracompetitive prices, that economic windfall to the
developer functions as an ex post, government-set prize.369 If government
366
Monopsony is a market condition in which there is only one buyer but many sellers. See NEVA
GOODWIN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 234 (2014). Oligopsony is a market
condition in which there are a relatively small number of buyers. Id. at 235.
367
See, e.g., Harris Letter, supra note 13, at 1; supra text accompanying notes 314–315.
368
See supra text accompanying notes 317, 350–351.
369
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 333.
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purchases are coupled with sole source agreements—agreements to buy a
particular kind of technology or service from only one supplier—this
arguably constitutes a form of regulatory exclusivity.370 This too is already
occurring: Recall that Mark Perlin was particularly aggrieved to be
excluded from the FBI’s proposal to enter a “sole source contract” to
purchase probabilistic genotyping software.371 A sole source contract
granted to a competitor was not merely the loss of one sale for Perlin; it
was exclusion from a lucrative market.372
As mentioned above, more traditional innovation mechanisms are also
already in use, in at least small measure. The federal government
previously has established formal prizes for innovators in this field,
including a prize for “develop[ing] algorithms that advance place-based
crime forecasting.”373 Government grants have also supported work to
develop criminal justice algorithms. For instance, Perlin received multiple
grants under the SBIR program, some of which appear to have supported
TrueAllele’s development.374
To be sure, vigorous assertions of trade secret protection in this field
may suggest that existing alternative incentives are not yet adequate to
obviate the commercial value of secrecy.375 If that is so, these existing
alternative incentives for innovation offer a framework for recalibrating the
rewards of innovation to do so. For instance, in exchange for source code
disclosure, government purchasers might guarantee a higher purchase price
or longer single source contract term for the successful private developer of
a criminal justice algorithm or related tool. The federal government, in
particular, may be well suited to establish new prizes or grants for the
development of such technologies. The precise details of which alternative
innovation mechanisms are best deployed—and in what measure—must
await further experience with innovation in the shadow of adequate
disclosure requirements. For now, it is enough to appreciate that alternative
mechanisms for encouraging innovation exist, are already in use in some

370

See supra text accompanying notes 350–351.
See Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 1.
372
Cf. Heled, supra note 264, at 300–02 (describing regulatory exclusivities as frequently requiring
a regulator to refrain from approving a second market entrant for a period of time after approving the
first market participant—thus excluding second comers from the market for a set period of time).
373
Real-Time Crime Forecasting Challenge, supra note 296.
374
Cybergenetics SBIR grants, supra note 330.
375
See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 8, at 101 (“Perlin admitted that no other scientists had seen his
code or reviewed it directly, and he stood by his refusal to make it available, defending it as a ‘trade
secret.’”); Ruger, supra note 75 (reporting that CMI initially refused to disclose source code for an
Intoxilyzer device despite a court order and despite the imposition of more than $500,000 in sanctions
for that refusal).
371
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measure in the criminal justice field, and can be modified as needed to
achieve independence from secrecy.
Indeed, in light of the panoply of existing innovation policy
mechanisms, policymakers might conclude that, even absent trade secrecy,
these existing benefits are sufficient to spur innovation. Trade secrecy, in
other words, may simply arrogate a particularly harmful windfall to
developers. This is not a far-fetched conclusion. For both probabilistic
genotyping and recidivism risk score software packages, the market already
includes competitors with publicly available source code.376 Insofar as
maintaining source code secrecy is unnecessary for either competitive
success or valuable innovation, requiring government contractors to
exchange trade secrecy for disclosure may not yield a worrisome lack of
innovation.
B. Innovating Optimal Disclosure
While appropriate innovation policy for criminal justice algorithms
may avoid typically difficult choices about who pays for innovation due to
the purchasing role of government entities, policy setting in this field may
underscore a different kind of policy difference, turning on the scope and
timing of disclosure. As set forth above, alternative innovation policy
mechanisms are readily available and may be readily paired with disclosure
requirements. Apart from patents, however, use of an innovation policy
tool does not inherently establish the scope and timing of relevant
disclosure.377 For criminal justice technologies, disclosure that is broad and
early offers significant advantages over disclosure that is confined to an
individual criminal case in either scope or timing.
First, source code disclosure, or disclosure that a criminal justice
technology is in use, may extend either narrowly or broadly. If narrowly,
only individuals involved in a particular case would gain access to this
information. This might arise where a court orders source code disclosure
subject to a protective order.378 A broader remedy might demand public

376
See U.S. Loomis Brief, supra note 15, at *17 n.5 (observing that several states have
“develop[ed] and validat[ed] publicly available risk-assessment measures for consideration at
sentencing”); PCAST REPORT, supra note 17, at 78–79; Roth, supra note 20, at 2019.
377
On timing of patent disclosure, see 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012).
378
See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 122–23 (N.J. 2008) (describing the efforts undertaken by the
courts and parties to examine the source code of the alcohol breath test device at issue while preventing
broader disclosure of that code); Protective Order Regarding the Confidentiality of the Forensic
Statistical Tool (FST) Source Code and Related Documents, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR00565 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2016) (putting in place a protective order for FST, which order was
subsequently vacated in October 2017); Wexler, supra note 10, at 50–53 (arguing that protective orders,

717

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

disclosure. A court might order source code disclosure absent any
protective order.379 Conversely, legislatures and agencies setting the terms
for prizes, grants, regulatory exclusivities, and tax incentives, as well as
procurement offices preparing purchase agreements, might more easily and
efficiently condition those awards, rewards, and sales on public
disclosure.380
Broad disclosure offers several advantages over narrow disclosure. As
discussed earlier, outside review of source code has identified algorithmic
weaknesses and errors on numerous occasions.381 Public access to source
code facilitates thorough investigation by multiple reviewers, making it
more likely that errors will be identified and corrected.382 Broad disclosure
also enables multiple groups, including nonprofit criminal defense
organizations, to share the financial and other costs of validating a software
program and examining software updates and software status on an
ongoing basis.383 Finally, broad disclosure may itself act as an incentive for
further innovation by providing more material on which new innovation
can build.384

not nondisclosure, are the appropriate response to assertions of trade secrecy in the context of criminal
justice algorithms).
379
To date, only one court has made public the source code disclosed as part of criminal discovery.
Order, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-CR-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017); Kirchner, supra note
112. Note, however, that the software at issue in that case, FST, was not developed by a private
company but rather by the New York City crime laboratory in the Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner. Kirchner, supra note 112. Accordingly, public disclosure of this code raises somewhat
different secrecy and innovation concerns.
Indeed, given current experience, it seems unlikely that a court would order source code disclosure
absent a protective order. This is particularly unlikely if a private developer’s assertion of trade secret
protection arrives in court with trade secret status intact. For the reasons set out below, courts may have
greater flexibility to order broad disclosure if other government entities have already secured the
relevant disclosures by other means (e.g., as a condition of receiving a prize, grant, regulatory
exclusivity, or tax benefit). See infra text accompanying notes 386–404. In light of the multitude of
alternative innovation policy mechanisms available in this field, however, courts should be increasingly
inclined to order at least some source code disclosure where relevant. See Wexler, supra note 10, at 25
(“[I]ntellectual property should not receive such special treatment.”); cf. 3 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE
SECRETS LAW § 27:13 (under Florida’s trade secret law, “[s]uch factors as . . . protection afforded by
copyright and patent laws . . . may guide the court in deciding whether to order disclosure”).
380
Cf. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 19, at 356 (“[T]he award of a grant, prize, or tax credit
should be conditioned on public disclosure to the extent that such disclosure does not significantly
undermine the innovation incentive.”).
381
See supra text accompanying notes 166–175.
382
Freeman, supra note 151, at 102.
383
Broad disclosure coupled with alternative innovation policies may yield additional advantages.
For instance, at the same time that the government invests in grants to develop new or improved
criminal justice algorithms, it might pioneer new grants for outside criminal justice organizations to
examine and validate those algorithms.
384
See supra text accompanying notes 201–203.
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Second, source code disclosure, or disclosure that a criminal justice
technology is in use, may come at two different times: either when software
is created or offered for sale, regardless of its acceptance in court; or when
software is used in a particular case. This choice may be interdependent
with the scope of disclosure. Early disclosure will likely be broader in
scope, as it would not arise from a particular prosecution within which
disclosure could be confined. Indeed, courts have little opportunity to opine
upon or order preprosecution disclosure because court authority is limited
to adjudicating the individual cases before the court. Conversely,
legislatures and agencies establishing and administering innovation
policies, as well as procurement offices purchasing technology, may
require disclosure prior to disbursement of a reward like a prize or
regulatory exclusivity, or following completion of a grant or tax creditsupported research project.
Earlier disclosure, like broad disclosure, offers several advantages
over case-dependent disclosure. By the time a criminal case is underway,
the government has likely already committed significant resources to
selecting, buying, and learning how to use a particular piece of technology.
The costs of responding to a product’s failure of reliability or validity will
be lower the earlier that failure is brought to light.385 Discovering a
technology failure in the midst of a criminal case is particularly costly, as
that failure jeopardizes the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the state’s
interest in prosecuting law breakers.386 Moreover, earlier disclosure would
empower courts to order source code disclosure more readily, as developers
would already have traded trade secret protection for other innovation
incentives. Thus, disclosure may be most efficient, and efficiently enforced,
when it is required at the time a developer submits a bid for an exclusive
government contract,387 requests a necessary preapproval for sale,388 or
simply solicits sales from the state.
385
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 207 (1995) (describing third-degree path dependence, where dependence on initial
conditions results in an inefficient but avoidable outcome).
386
Consider the case of Nick Hillary. In that case, two different probabilistic genotyping software
programs, TrueAllele and STRmix, returned inconsistent results about whether Hillary’s DNA matched
DNA recovered from a murder scene. See Wexler, supra note 10, at 23–24. In light of the inconsistent
test results, the judge excluded the matching result from trial, and Hillary was acquitted. See Roth,
supra note 20, at 2019–20 (describing the Hillary case).
387
See, e.g., Perlin Letter, supra note 95, at 1 (noting that the FBI proposed a “sole source contract”
for probabilistic genotyping software).
388
See, e.g., Roth, supra note 20, at 2023 (“In the machine context, states have imposed protocols
most conspicuously for breath-alcohol tests, requiring that testers use an approved machine . . . .”);
Patrick, supra note 39 (describing Harris’s efforts to obtain FCC approval to sell stingray devices to
state and local law enforcement entities).
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In sum, optimal disclosure would be both broad and early. Like
optimal innovation policy, optimal disclosure policy is principally the
province of legislators and regulators, rather than courts. Although courts
may be well situated to order broad as well as party-limited disclosure,
courts are not well situated to order early disclosure. As discussed below,
this does not mean that judicial disclosure decisions are immaterial to
achieving appropriate innovation policy.389 But it does necessitate that
optimal standard setting in this field enlist legislatures, agencies, and
procurement offices in requiring broad and early disclosure as a condition
of accessing innovation rewards.
C. Innovation and Judicial Disclosure Decisions
Although courts cannot command optimal disclosure or institute
alternative innovation policies directly, they have a crucial role to play in
bringing about appropriate and effective innovation policy. To date, courts
have largely been content to defer to assertions of trade secret protection,
and government entities have been keen to defend those assertions.390 But
that deference is not unalterable. Adjudicating an assertion of trade secret
privilege calls for a court to balance a defendant’s need for the privileged
information against the likely harm from disclosure.391 In making that
determination, a court may consider whether alternative innovation
incentives mitigate the risks of disclosure.392 As set forth above, many
alternative incentives already exist in the field of criminal justice
algorithms.393 If those alternative measures still come up short, they offer a
ready roadmap for adapting incentives to achieve innovation without
incurring the harms of secrecy.394 Accordingly, courts need not wait for
legislatures to act before ordering source code disclosure. To the contrary,
courts should be emboldened by the existence of alternative innovation
policy levers to reject trade secrecy in the first instance.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that courts are the best-situated
institution to initiate source code disclosure. That is so because, in many
cases, the government entities responsible for supporting and procuring
criminal justice technologies are not interested in disclosing those
technologies to anyone. Police departments have obfuscated their use of

389
390
391
392
393
394
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See infra Section IV.C.
See supra Part I.
See 1 JAGER, supra note 379, § 5:33.
See id. § 27:13; see also Wexler, supra note 10, at 43–44.
See supra Section IV.A.
See id.
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technologies like stingrays.395 The Baltimore police department declined to
inform even other Baltimore public officials—including the mayor—about
its use of persistent aerial surveillance and photography of the city to track
and solve crimes.396 And some state procurement offices have declined to
negotiate for any access to source code in purchasing criminal justice
technology like alcohol breath test devices.397 At a minimum, courts are
likely to be more interested in disclosure and constitutional assessment of
these programs than are the government entities already invested in their
success. Even if these entities evaluate these technologies in good faith,
they will have “already deemed them valid and reliable according to
whatever procurement standards apply, and will have weak incentives to
identify information that could prove otherwise.”398 A court’s refusal to
defer to an assertion of trade secrecy enables scrutiny of criminal justice
technology by the institutional participant most motivated to uncover its
flaws—the defendant.
Jettisoning trade secrecy nondisclosure in a court proceeding in the
first instance may yield other benefits as well. In some instances,
independent bases for continued secrecy may exist. Thus, the government
might seek to preserve source code secrecy not for trade secret reasons but
for security reasons. Harris prevailed upon this reasoning in seeking
nondisclosure about stingray devices from the FTC.399 Law enforcement
may be concerned that disclosure could enable law breakers or criminal
defendants to “game” the system or circumvent surveillance technology.400
Insofar as there are legitimate alternative bases for nondisclosure, a courtinitiated process would enable those alternative bases to be litigated on
their own terms.401
395
See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (describing the state’s
failure to disclose the use of stingray to locate criminal defendant); see generally Section I.A
(discussing nondisclosure of stingray use in criminal investigations).
396
See Tom Dart, Eye in the Sky: The Billionaires Funding a Surveillance Project Above
Baltimore, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/baltimoresurveillance-john-laura-arnold-billionaires [https://perma.cc/W8JD-PN6G] (describing the privatelyfunded aerial surveillance program in Baltimore).
397
See Short, supra note 11, at 195.
398
Wexler, supra note 10, at 63.
399
See Harris Letter, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that disclosure “could cause significant harm to
federal, state, and local law enforcement surveillance activities”).
400
See Kroll et al., supra note 180, at 634.
401
It is far from clear that these alternative arguments for nondisclosure would be successful. For
one thing, the pedigree of the law enforcement privilege may not be as pristine as modern cases suggest.
See Smith, supra note 40, at 242–46. For another, concerns that disclosure will imperil investigative
methods frequently appear overstated. Such concerns are decidedly misplaced with respect to
probabilistic genotyping software because criminals are (at present) unable to alter their DNA to evade
identification. Disclosure of source code for alcohol breath test devices also has not hampered their use
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Finally, a court-initiated disclosure requirement is not a second best
solution; rather, it is likely to be an essential first step to improved
innovation policy. If courts stop deferring to assertions of trade secret
protection, other government entities will need to determine whether
recalibrating innovation incentives is necessary to sustain innovation in this
field. In so doing, these policymakers and purchasers may conclude that
broader and earlier disclosure is better, both as a matter of innovation
policy and as a matter of justice.402 After all, source code secrecy imposes
harms not only on criminal defendants and the judiciary in whose
courtrooms justice is meted out;403 it also imposes harms on innovation
itself, inhibiting innovation of better software and other criminal justice
tools.404 Earlier and broader disclosure may help to ensure that technologies
in which the government invests considerable sums of public money is
legitimate, reliable, and accurate—the better to ensure its future acceptance
in individual criminal prosecutions.
Recalling the recent experience with New York City’s own
probabilistic genotyping software, FST, reinforces the importance of
judicial decisionmaking in this arena. Although FST is a governmentdeveloped tool,405 the city crime lab repeatedly resisted efforts to examine
FST’s source code in criminal cases, describing the code as
“proprietary.”406 But in July 2016, a federal district court ordered the
laboratory to turn FST’s source code over to a defense expert for analysis,
subject to a strict protective order.407 After reviewing FST’s source code,
the expert concluded, “the correctness of the behavior of the FST software
should be seriously questioned.”408 Not long after, the New York City crime

or effectiveness. See In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d
525, 542 (Minn. 2012); State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 159 (N.J. 2008). And the content of certain
nondisclosure agreements between the FBI and law enforcement entities belies Harris’s assertion of
significant law enforcement secrecy concerns. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text
(discussing Tucson’s nondisclosure agreement, which allocates the power to determine disclosure to
Harris, thus attenuating any relationship between nondisclosure and legitimate law enforcement
concerns).
402
On the importance of broad and early access to source code, see supra Part II and Section IV.B.
403
See supra Sections II.A–B.
404
See Strandburg, supra note 202 at 113; text accompanying notes 201–203 (discussing the
relationship between disclosure and follow-on innovation).
405
See ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108.
406
Kirchner, supra note 112 (“The office has long kept the source code secret, successfully
opposing requests in court by defense attorneys to examine it.”); Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note
91.
407
See Order at 1–2, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016);
ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108, at 7.
408
Kirchner, supra note 112.
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lab announced that it was discontinuing use of that software.409 ProPublica
subsequently sought to intervene in the case, requesting that the court lift
the protective order on FST’s source code and the expert analysis.410 On
October 16, 2017, the district court granted ProPublica’s request.411
There was another significant consequence of the litigation
surrounding FST: In August 2017, as ProPublica sought to unmask FST
more fully, members of the New York City Council introduced a bill
designed to bring greater transparency to the algorithms and other
automated processing systems upon which city agencies frequently rely.412
In December 2017, the Council passed an amended version of that bill,
becoming the first U.S. jurisdiction to begin to tackle the risks arising from
secrecy surrounding algorithmic decisionmaking in public life.413
Thus, court-initiated disclosure under a protective order was the first
step in a process that culminated in the publication of the source code of an
advanced criminal justice algorithm—and that spurred legislative interest
in greater transparency earlier and more broadly than a court could require.
The final bill that New York City approved, however, leaves much undone.
Most significantly, it states that “[n]othing herein shall require . . .
disclosure of any information where that disclosure would . . . result in the
disclosure of proprietary information.”414 The New York City Council bill

409
Kirchner, Traces of Crime, supra note 91. OCME also announced that, in place of FST, it
would use the privately developed and proprietary STRmix. Id.
410
ProPublica Memorandum, supra note 108, at 8–9.
411
Order at 2, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2017). Lauren
Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-yorkcrime-labs-software-for-analyzing-dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/J9SF-4AVJ].
412
N.Y.C. COUNCIL, INT. NO. 1696-2017 (N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
View.ashx?M=F&ID=5386249&GUID=24719B50-305D-486F-ACA7-3178E9F32D8B
[https://perma.cc/M3D2-5N3R].
413
See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, INT. NO. 1696-2017 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0
[https://perma.cc/389L-972M]; see also Rashida Richardson, New York City Takes on Algorithmic
Discrimination, ACLU (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/new-york-city-takes-algorithmic-discrimination [https://perma.cc/L468-CF95] (“A firstin-the-nation bill, passed yesterday in New York City, offers a way to help ensure the computer codes
that governments use to make decisions are serving justice rather than inequality.”).
414
See N.Y.C. COUNCIL, PROPOSED INT. NO. 1696-A, ¶ 6 (N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017),
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=5678638&GUID=2E9A800E-958D-4038-A38B4A101B740FFE [https://perma.cc/DEJ7-E5X6]. The bill as amended would do much less to further the
goal of public transparency in other ways as well. In place of a requirement to publish algorithms in a
publicly-accessible manner, the amended bill calls instead for the formation of a task force to consider
which “agency automated decision systems” ought to be subject to transparency and disclosure
requirements and to make recommendations about whether and in what form transparency and
disclosure might be achieved. Id.
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thus reaffirms the significant role that courts may play in this arena in
compelling disclosure. Even though optimal innovation policy for criminal
justice algorithms requires the participation of policymakers, the impetus
for change may—and perhaps must—begin with courts.
CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system has experienced an explosion in the
number, complexity, and use of privately developed software tools
throughout the criminal justice process.415 Police employ privately
developed investigative tools to perform crucial law enforcement functions,
prosecutors rely on evidence produced by complex software algorithms to
win convictions, and judges trust privately developed algorithms to
accurately identify the likelihood that a defendant will commit another
crime in the future. Yet, frequently, the source code of these tools—their
“lifeblood”416—and, sometimes, their very existence and use by law
enforcement are shielded from scrutiny. The developers of these tools
persistently and stridently assert that disclosure will injure their competitive
interests. And courts have largely acquiesced, despite the significant
practical and potentially constitutional costs of such secrecy to individual
defendants, the criminal justice system, and the development of welldesigned criminal justice algorithms more broadly.
That is the law as it is; but that acquiescence is not inevitable. The
government has at its disposal a multitude of alternative policy mechanisms
to spur innovation, none of which mandate secrecy and most of which will
easily accommodate a robust disclosure requirement. Several of these
mechanisms are already in use, encouraging innovation through research
and development grants and exclusive procurement contracts. Recalibrating
the non-trade-secret rewards for innovation is likely to be particularly
efficient and effective in this field, where government is both a funder of
research and the primary purchaser of criminal justice algorithms. In sum,
innovation does not require secrecy. Where, as here, secrecy imposes
significant systemic costs, secrecy must go.

415
416
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